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INTRODUCTION
Excessive risk taking by firm managers did not originate with the financial crisis of 2007–2008. Though bankers had special incentives to take
big risks in the period before the crisis, the incentive effects of equity-based
compensation have been understood for some time. As Michael Jensen and
William Meckling explained over three decades ago, in the presence of outside creditors, equity incentives may cause managers to go overboard, to
take inefficient risks at the expense of creditors and others.1 For bankers,
those incentives were writ large with the financial crisis, intensified as they
were by the moral hazard that accompanies government guaranties of bank
deposits. I propose to ameliorate this gamblers’ incentive with a new approach to compensation at the largest banks, one that explicitly accounts for
the possibility of excessive risk taking and incentivizes bankers against it. I
propose that bankers be paid in part with their banks’ public subordinated
debt (sub debt) securities.
Constraining bank risk taking is an unending task for bank regulators,
even outside the crisis context, because of certain special features of banks.
Banks are highly leveraged—that is, they operate predominantly on borrowed money. Bank executives also typically enjoy high levels of equitybased incentive pay. These two factors would encourage risky strategies in
any firm because managers’ equity stakes enjoy an unlimited upside return
if a risky investment succeeds, but any losses are borne primarily by creditors when a risky investment fails. Creditors of ordinary (nonbanking)
firms understand these incentives, so they typically negotiate contractual
constraints on their borrower firms’ risk taking. But banks are different: a
significant group of creditors—namely, insured depositors—do not monitor
banks’ risk taking. Because deposits are insured by the government, bank
depositors are indifferent as to their banks’ risk taking.2 Regulators are
therefore left with the task of constraining risk taking at banks. And regulation is imperfect.
Policy analysts have decried the role of executive compensation in
promoting excessive risk taking leading up to the financial crisis,3 and Congress and regulators have imposed new constraints on banker pay.4 Aca1

Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 333−34 (1976) (discussing the agency costs of debt
versus equity); see infra note 53 and accompanying text.
2
As the discussion implies, my focus is on commercial banks—deposit-taking institutions—and not
investment banks or other types of “nonbank” financial institutions.
3
Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Oct. 22, 2009), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20091022a.htm (quoting Federal Reserve
Chairman Ben S. Bernanke) (“Compensation practices at some banking organizations have led to misaligned incentives and excessive risk-taking, contributing to bank losses and financial instability. . . . The
Federal Reserve is working to ensure that compensation packages appropriately tie rewards to longerterm performance and do not create undue risk for the firm or the financial system.”).
4
See infra Part II.D.
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demics have likewise proposed banker pay reforms.5 Two important proposals have recently emerged—one by Lucian Bebchuk and Holger Spamann6 and another by Sanjai Bhagat and Roberta Romano.7
Bebchuk and Spamann propose to pay bankers with a representative
slice of all of their firm’s securities—preferred stock and bonds as well as
common equity.8 This approach would hopefully reduce risk taking, since
preferred stockholders and bondholders generally prefer less risk than
common shareholders do.9 Bhagat and Romano propose long-term equity
pay for bankers.10 Bankers would be paid with stock they could not sell until several years after they retire from their firms on the theory that this
lengthy holding period would induce bankers to adopt a long-term perspective in their decisionmaking.11
In this Article, I introduce a new approach to banker pay that offers
important advantages over the Bebchuk–Spamann and Bhagat–Romano
proposals. I propose that, in addition to equity, bank executives should receive some portion of their compensation in the form of their bank’s publicly traded subordinated debt securities.12
Recent theoretical and empirical research shows that, as a CEO’s holdings of her firm’s debt increase relative to the value of her equity holdings—that is, as her “inside debt–equity ratio” increases—the firm’s risk
taking declines.13 Such inside debt holdings help to align managers’ interests with those of their firms’ creditors, who are more risk averse than equity holders. In a recent paper, Xue Wang and I empirically test for this
5

See infra Part IV.A–B. A few scholars express some doubt as to the significance of bankers’
compensation structures as a factor in precipitating the recent financial crisis. See, e.g., Compensation
Structure and Systemic Risk: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 173−75 (2009)
(statement of Kevin J. Murphy, Kenneth L. Trefftzs Chair in Finance, Marshall School of Business,
University of Southern California); Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René M. Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and
the Credit Crisis, 99 J. FIN. ECON. 11 (2011).
6
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247 (2010); see
infra Part IV.B.
7
Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing
to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359 (2009); see infra Part IV.A.
8
See infra Part IV.B.
9
Because preferred stockholders and bondholders do not enjoy the unlimited upside return that
common shareholders do, preferred stockholders and bondholders eschew high-risk, potentially highreturn bets that, if successful, would generate large returns for common shareholders. Instead, preferred
stockholders and bondholders prefer relatively lower risk, lower return strategies. See Clifford W.
Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN.
ECON. 117, 118−19 (1979) (explaining conflicts between bondholders and common shareholders over
investment strategies).
10
See infra Part IV.A
11
See infra Part IV.A.
12
See infra Part III.B.
13
See infra Part III.A. The inside debt in these studies, including ours, is in the form of pension and
deferred compensation obligations of the firm to the CEO.
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effect of inside debt in the specific context of the recent financial crisis.14
We offer important evidence that higher pre-crisis inside debt–equity ratios
for bankers correlate with lower firm risk and better firm performance during the crisis.15 Paying bankers with debt may therefore curb their appetite
for risk, consistent with regulators’ goal of assuring bank safety and soundness.
Publicly traded subordinated bank debt may be an ideal form of debt
compensation for bankers because market pricing of this debt will offer a
continuing referendum on risk taking at the bank. If the bank fails, its subordinated debt will be repaid only after all depositors and general creditors
were paid in full. Moreover, since subordinated debt claims are fixed, subordinated debtholders do not enjoy the unlimited upside from the bank’s
risky bets that equity holders do. Market pricing of the debt will therefore
be particularly sensitive to downside risk, much more so than equity. These
risk-related price fluctuations will directly affect bankers’ wealth, giving
bankers useful feedback and important incentives with respect to excessive
risk taking.
My proposal provides two important advantages over existing proposals. First, it offers a more direct and reliable inducement for bankers to curb
excessive risk taking. The largest banks are owned and operated as wholly
owned subsidiaries of bank holding companies (BHCs), which also typically own other financial institutions. The Bebchuk–Spamann and Bhagat–
Romano proposals would compensate bankers with holding company securities: long-term equity for Bhagat and Romano, and BHC common and preferred stock and bonds for Bebchuk and Spamann. But because BHCs own
other financial institutions besides the given banking subsidiary, market
pricing of BHC securities can offer bankers only noisy and indirect incentives with respect to risk taking at the bank. Market discipline works best if
the bank itself issues the securities as opposed to the BHC of which it is a
subsidiary. My approach is the first to explicitly overcome this problem by
paying bankers with debt securities issued by the bank itself.16

14

Frederick Tung & Xue Wang, Bank CEOs, Inside Debt Compensation, and the Global Financial
Crisis (Sept. 22, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1570161.
15
Id. at 3.
16
Given the BHC structure and the variation of management structures within BHCs, the identification of the specific bank executives to be targeted for pay regulation may not be a straightforward task.
The CEO and other top officers of a banking subsidiary should clearly be covered by my proposed pay
constraints. Holding company officers may need to be covered as well. Holding company officers will
typically have significant influence over policy decisions at banking subsidiaries and may even be officers of the banking subsidiaries. For example, Kenneth D. Lewis, the CEO, Chairman, and President of
Bank of America Corporation, serves in these same capacities for Bank of America, N.A., its principal
banking subsidiary. Bank of Am. Corp., Proxy Statement 16 (Mar. 18, 2009), available at
http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/irol/71/71595/reports/2009_Proxy.pdf. When BHC officers
wield important influence over a banking subsidiary’s policy decisions, they should be made to hold
subordinated debt of that bank. See infra Part III.D.
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In addition, my approach facilitates the tailoring of annual pay to
achieve desirable portfolio incentives for bankers in a way that existing
proposals cannot. The primary focus for structuring banker pay should be
on managing bankers’ personal portfolios of their firms’ securities and other claims on their firms.17 These portfolios typically dwarf bankers’ annual
pay and so exert a much stronger influence on bankers’ risk taking than
does annual pay. Compensation should be structured primarily with these
portfolio incentives in mind.18 The Bebchuk–Spamann “by-the-slice” approach does not directly respond to the problem of excessive risk.19 Because bankers’ existing portfolios matter, and because the composition of
their portfolios varies, countering a banker’s tendency toward excessive risk
requires something more tailored than simple by-the-BHC-slice compensation. Similarly, Bhagat and Romano’s long-term BHC equity approach
does nothing to address existing portfolio effects.20
Requiring bankers to hold their own banks’ debt would not substitute
for traditional external regulation but would offer an important supplement
to the existing regulatory toolkit for constraining bank risk taking. Unlike
existing tools, this one works by directly altering bank managers’ personal
incentives with regard to risk,21 and unlike existing reform proposals, it is
sufficiently flexible to be able to tailor bankers’ sensitivity to downside risk
in light of their existing portfolios and their banks’ specific circumstances.
In Part I, I explain the special regulatory and governance problems of
banks. High leverage combined with regulation-induced moral hazard
make excessive risk taking a special problem at banks. Part II recounts the
pay-for-performance movement and its effect on the evolution of incentive
pay for bankers. The pay-for-performance movement coincided with a decades-long trend of banking deregulation. Together these overlapping trends
have shaped the current equity-fueled structure of banker pay. Part III de-

17

The most important of these other claims are pension and deferred compensation claims, which
exert a debt-like influence on managers. See infra Part III.A.
18
As with all executive pay proposals, hedging against the risks imposed by the pay structure would
be strictly forbidden. Otherwise, the intended incentive structure would be frustrated.
19
See infra Part IV.B.
20
Moreover, the Bhagat–Romano long-term BHC equity approach cannot offer the strong incentives that bank sub debt provides. In addition to the noisy proxy problem described above, long-term
equity would offer only a weak incentive for bankers because of the long delay in realizing their rewards
for good performance. This is exacerbated by the “control gap” they are forced to endure: during the
period after retirement but before they can cash out their shares, they will have no influence over the
firm’s performance. Someone else will be in control. See infra Part IV.A.
21
Kose John, Anthony Saunders & Lemma W. Senbet, A Theory of Bank Regulation and Management Compensation, 13 REV. FIN. STUD. 95, 97 (2000) (“Unlike capital and asset regulations, which
have at best indirect effects on managerial incentives and thus on managerial decisions, altering topmanagement compensation is a direct and effective way of influencing managerial return and risk-taking
incentives.”). John, Saunders, and Senbet argue that FDIC deposit insurance pricing should account for
bank managers’ compensation arrangements. See id.

1209

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

scribes my banker pay proposal. Part IV describes and critiques existing
proposals for reform. Part V discusses implementation issues.
I. THE BANK CONFIDENCE GAME
Banks depend on public confidence for their survival. Because of the
importance of the financial system, the states and the federal government
act to instill public confidence in banks. Since the 1930s, deposit insurance
has been a critical element in this confidence game,22 but as with insurance
generally, deposit insurance creates moral hazard: bankers take greater risks
than they would without the insurance. This side effect requires government supervision of banking activities. This Part explains the basics of the
bank confidence game, its potential for encouraging excessive risk taking at
banks, and the difficulties of crafting an adequate regulatory response.
A. Bank Runs
Banks are special institutions and are very different from other businesses. First, they are highly leveraged. They carry far more debt, relative
to the value of their assets, than most other businesses. With leverage,
shareholders and their agents prefer riskier bets than if the firm had no debt
because the payoffs from leveraged bets are asymmetric. Shareholders enjoy unlimited payoffs from a successful high-risk bet with borrowed money,
but limited liability assures that they lose only the amount of their investment in the firm should the high-risk bet turn out badly. The remaining
losses are born by the firm’s creditors.23
In addition to high leverage, bank assets and liabilities are mismatched.24 Most of their liabilities are volatile, taking the form of customer
deposits that must be repaid upon demand. Though it is relatively unlikely
that all or even most of a bank’s customers would demand repayment of
their deposits concurrently,25 the demand nature of the liabilities means that
banks are to some extent always dealing with uncertainty regarding their
cash outlays. In essence, they worry that all (or a significant portion of)
their loans—in the form of customers’ deposits—will be called at once.26

22

Deposit insurance protects depositors of insured banks from the risk of loss of their deposits if an
insured bank fails. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., YOUR INSURED DEPOSITS, http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/
deposits/insured/basics.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2011).
23
See infra note 32.
24
See Charles K. Whitehead, The Evolution of Debt: Covenants, the Credit Market, and Corporate
Governance, 34 J. CORP. L. 641, 654−55 (2009) (describing the traditional banking function of balancing mismatched assets and liabilities).
25
When this happens, of course, this is the dreaded bank run.
26
Banking regulators set reserve requirements, mandating that banks hold some minimum amount
of readily accessible funds to be able to meet depositors’ withdrawal demands. Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 12 U.S.C. § 461 (2006) [hereinafter DIDMCA].
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Banks’ assets, on the other hand, primarily take the form of longerterm loans—medium- to long-term promises of regular periodic payments
from their borrowers. Because of this mismatch of relatively illiquid assets
with extremely liquid liabilities, banks are vulnerable to runs. Historically,
even rumors of a bank’s imminent failure might set off a race among its depositors to withdraw their funds from the bank all at once. Of course, no
bank holds cash sufficient to meet all of its depositors’ simultaneous withdrawal demands. Banks lend almost all of their deposit money out. With a
bank run, individual depositors face a collective action problem. If an individual depositor fears that many other depositors are racing to the bank to
withdraw their funds, then that individual depositor is forced to do the
same. She will want to get her money out while the bank still has cash.
The run becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, and the liquidity crunch will
cause even a solvent bank to fail.
In this sense, then, commercial banking is something of a confidence
game. While high leverage encourages risk taking, a commercial bank survives only as long as its depositors are confident of its continuing solvency
and ability to meet withdrawal demands. Historically, banking laws have
attempted various strategies to curb banks’ risk taking and to improve depositor confidence in banks and the banking system as a whole.27 Today, federal deposit insurance serves as a principal bulwark for depositor
confidence.
B. Deposit Insurance and Banker Moral Hazard
In the wake of the Great Depression, Congress established the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to insure the deposits of member
banks.28 The federal guarantee of bank deposits prevents most runs because
depositors are confident that FDIC insurance will cover failed banks’ deposit liabilities.29
27

For example, unlimited or double liability for bank shareholders was a common approach in the
1800s. See Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, Solving the Corporate Governance Problems of
Banks: A Proposal, 120 BANKING L.J. 326, 331 (2003). Double liability made bank shareholders personally liable for an amount equal to the amount they had invested in their shares of the bank. Id. Courts
have also periodically imposed special fiduciary duties on bank directors during or after banking crises.
See Patricia A. McCoy, A Political Economy of the Business Judgment Rule in Banking: Implications
for Corporate Law, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 5 (1996) (describing the cyclicality of court decisions
applying the business judgment rule to directors of failed banks); see also Macey & O’Hara, supra, at
335–37 (discussing cases).
28
Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.).
29
Before the 2007–2008 financial crisis, the ceiling on deposit insurance was $100,000 per depositor. On October 3, 2008, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) temporarily raised the basic limit to $250,000, which was set to return to $100,000 after December 31, 2009. Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 136, 122 Stat. 3765, 3799. The Dodd–
Frank Act made the $250,000 ceiling permanent, as well as retroactive to January 1, 2008, in order to
cover depositors at banks that failed early in the financial crisis before EESA’s enactment. Dodd–Frank
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Deposit insurance has some undesirable side effects, though. Even
with nonfinancial firms, which are less leveraged and not generally at risk
of having to pay off their major liabilities on demand, a conflict exists between equity holders and creditors. As the finance canon has taught us,
debt and equity generally hold differing risk preferences.30 The flip side of
shareholders’ preference for risky bets at creditors’ expense is creditors’
preference for more conservative strategies. Creditors enjoy only a fixed
upside—their interest payments and return of principal at a loan’s maturity—and they enjoy a priority over equity in terms of repayment.31 Creditors
would therefore rather the firm avoid the high-risk, potentially high-return
bets that shareholders may prefer.32 High leverage generally magnifies this
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 335, 124 Stat. 1376, 1540
(2010).
30
See Smith & Warner, supra note 9, at 118.
31
In practice, this means that a firm must be solvent in order for the firm to make any distribution to
equity holders, and that upon dissolution creditors are repaid in full before equity holders receive any
distribution. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.40(c) (2008) (requiring that in order to make a distribution to
shareholders, the corporation must be solvent and able to pay its debts as they become due after giving
effect to the distribution); id. § 14.09(a) (requiring the directors to pay or provide for the payment of
claims before making distributions of assets to shareholders).
32
See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 333−34 (discussing the agency costs of debt versus equity).
A concrete example will illustrate. Assume a firm owes $90 of debt, has $100 in cash, and has two
investment options for its $100 in cash—a high-risk option and a low-risk option. The firm will pursue
one of its investment options, and then, whatever the outcome, the firm will liquidate and distribute its
assets to repay creditors, with shareholders receiving any residual.
The low-risk option has two possible outcomes:
(1) 60% chance of returning $110, or
(2) 40% chance of returning $90.
This low-risk option’s expected value to the firm is $102 ((60% × $110) + (40% × $90)). For its initial
$100 investment, the firm expects a net gain of $2.
The firm’s high-risk option has two possible outcomes:
(1) 10% chance of returning $1000, or
(2) 90% chance of returning $0.
This high-risk option’s expected value to the firm is $100 ((10% × $1000) + (90% × $0)). The firm expects no net gain from this investment.
The low-risk investment is clearly better for the firm and for creditors. Creditors will prefer the safer, low-risk investment because they will be repaid in full in any event. Whichever outcome occurs under the low-risk investment, the firm will still have at least $90 to pay creditors. By contrast, with the
high-risk investment, creditors face a 90% chance of being paid nothing.
Shareholders, however, will prefer the high-risk investment because its expected return to them is
much higher than with the low-risk investment. Consider the distribution of value as between creditors
and shareholders with the low-risk investment. The expected value of the $102 return is shared $90 to
creditors ((60% × $90) + (40% × $90)) and $12 to shareholders ((60% × $20) + (40% × $0)).
Now consider the distribution of returns from the high-risk investment. If the investment succeeds,
creditors will be paid in full, receiving their $90; if the investment fails, creditors will receive nothing.
Because there is only a 10% likelihood of full payment to creditors, and a 90% chance they will receive
nothing, their expected return is $9 ((10% × $90) + (90% × $0)). Shareholders, on the other hand, expect to receive $91 ((10% × $910) + (90% × $0)).
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debt–equity conflict and managers’ risk-taking tendencies.33 The higher the
leverage, the greater is the conflict.34
With banks, this agency cost of debt is even worse. Not only are banks
highly leveraged, but their capital structures are not like those of ordinary
(nonfinancial) firms. With ordinary firms, creditors—understanding firm
managers’ risk-taking predilections—bargain for constraints on risk taking
and monitor compliance.35 In addition, excessive risk taking increases borrowing costs for ordinary firms. At the limit, a risky firm may not be able
to borrow at any price. Banks, however, face a very different situation.
Much of their borrowing takes the form of demand deposits from many
small, widely dispersed customers. Because these customer–creditors enjoy
deposit insurance, they do not impose the contractual or market constraints
on bank risk taking that creditors would ordinarily impose on nonbanking
firms. Insured depositors do not monitor or price their credit to account for
insolvency or liquidity risk because FDIC insurance covers the risk. Bankers may shirk or steal;36 they may faithfully pursue wealth maximization for
shareholders by extending risky, high-interest loans. In any event, insured
depositors do not care. They are largely indifferent to bank risk taking, so
they do not impose the constraints that creditors typically demand with nonfinancial firms.
The product market discipline that affects nonfinancial firms also does
not operate well on banks. In a competitive market for deposit taking and
other financial services, customers selecting a bank would care about bank

So even though the risky investment is worth less to the firm overall and is much worse for creditors
in expected value terms, shareholders would push for the risky investment since its expected return to
them of $91 is much higher than their expected return of $12 from the low-risk investment. More generally, because of their differing rights to the firm’s returns, creditors and equity holders value investment opportunities differently, with creditors being more conservative and equity holders being more
risk preferring.
33
Id.; Teresa A. John & Kose John, Top-Management Compensation and Capital Structure, 48 J.
FIN. 949, 968 (1993).
34
The modern BHC structure, in which a holding company owns banks along with nonbank businesses as affiliates, intensifies this debt–equity conflict. The conflict is more severe because holding
company equity holders are effectively subordinated to both the debt of the holding company and the
debt of the banking subsidiary. See infra Part III.D.
35
Banks, for example, play an important monitoring role to constrain their borrowers’ risk taking.
See Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. REV. 115 (2009).
36
Over three decades ago, Jensen and Meckling explained the agency conflicts that accompany outside investment in a firm. Once outside equity holders are brought in as investors and firm managers
own less than all of the residual interests in the firm, managers have the incentive to shirk because they
enjoy only a fraction of the benefits of their efforts. They must share with outside equity holders. “[A]s
the manager’s ownership claim falls, his incentive to devote significant effort to creative activities such
as searching out new profitable ventures falls.” Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 313. Shirking becomes a problem because monitoring of managerial effort by outside investors may not be easy. Id. at
328.
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solvency and would channel their deposits accordingly.37 Deposit insurance, however, blunts the effect of financial stability as a margin of competition among banks.38 Moreover, deposit insurance premiums are not finely
calibrated to account for the particular risks posed by individual banks.39
Therefore, absent perfect regulatory oversight, bankers have an incentive to
externalize losses to the insurance pool—and indirectly to the healthy banks
that contribute to the insurance pool and the taxpayers that ultimately stand
behind the pool.40
Finally, as with nonfinancial firms, bank managers’ risk-taking incentives intensify as the bank nears insolvency. Note that insolvency is merely
the extreme case of high leverage, where a firm’s shareholders have nothing
left to lose, and managers are effectively betting with creditors’ money. As
in the high-leverage scenario, managers intent on benefiting shareholders
may pursue high-risk bets, even those with a negative expected value, to
creditors’ detriment.41 This problem is exacerbated with banks. A nonfinancial firm on the skids will run out of cash to invest. A bank, by contrast,
can raise the cash to double down by continuing to borrow. By raising deposit interest rates, banks can continue to attract cash because of the government insurance. A troubled bank therefore does not suffer the same
liquidity constraints that capital markets impose on nonfinancial companies
in distress.
C. Bank Risk Regulation
Deposit insurance essentially substitutes the government for insured
depositors as the major creditor of the bank. The government as creditor
37

The opacity of bank risk taking might as a practical matter preclude depositors and other unsophisticated outsiders from imposing market discipline on banks, even in the absence of deposit insurance. See Frederic S. Mishkin, Prudential Supervision: Why Is It Important and What Are the Issues?,
in PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION 1, 8 (Frederic S. Mishkin ed., 2001). One could imagine, though, that in
the absence of deposit insurance and government supervision private information intermediaries might
emerge to meet depositors’ demands for information on individual banks’ risk taking.
38
Financial stability is not wholly irrelevant to consumers, of course. Not all consumer financial
products offered by banks are insured. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 22. The same is true for
deposit accounts in excess of the FDIC insured limit. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., DEPOSIT
INSURANCE SUMMARY, http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits/dis/index.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2011)
(describing the FDIC insurance coverage limits).
39
See infra note 225 and accompanying text.
40
The FDIC maintains a deposit insurance fund with the insurance premiums collected from insured banks. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., THE DEPOSIT INSURANCE FUND, http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/
insurance/index.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2011). The FDIC uses the fund to repay failed banks’ depositors, but this repayment obligation does not depend on the solvency of the fund. FDIC insurance is
backed by the full faith and credit of the United States government, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note
38, which means that taxpayers ultimately back the insurance obligation.
41
See Frederick Tung, The New Death of Contract: Creeping Corporate Fiduciary Duties for Creditors, 57 EMORY L.J. 809, 820–23 (2008) (explaining shareholder-wealth-maximizing managers’ perverse incentives when the firm is at or near insolvency).
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has an economic interest in constraining excessive risk taking. Regulatory
agencies and their bank examiners represent the government in this endeavor. Unlike private creditors of nonfinancial firms, however, regulators do
not have their own money on the line. So while they possess significant
expertise and enjoy important regulatory powers, they may lack the strong
incentives of private lenders to efficiently monitor firms’ management.
Private lenders with their own money on the line will expend resources
monitoring only to the point where the marginal cost of monitoring equals
the marginal benefit. Government regulators do not have such finely honed
incentives. The extent of their monitoring is politically determined. In
some cases, their regulation and supervision may be excessive; in others, it
may be insufficient.42 The prospect of regulatory capture of course also
lurks.43
In addition to incentive problems, regulators may suffer from information deficits in the face of financial innovation.44 Innovation often transcends regulatory classifications or lines of regulatory authority, making it
quite difficult for regulators to keep up.45 More generally, accurately quantifying the credit risk in a bank’s loan portfolio is no simple task.46
Especially when an economy is booming, it may be difficult for regulators to rein in bank risk taking,47 which would curtail the supply of credit to
profitable (or potentially profitable) enterprises. In good economic times,
investors in firms and banks will want their firms to take risks and their
banks to finance them, and they may incentivize managers to do so. The
next Part explains the structure of bankers’ incentive pay preceding the recent financial crisis and offers some historical context for performancebased pay for bankers.

42

Regulatory forbearance may be an especially tricky problem. See infra notes 138–41 and accompanying text.
43
See Howell E. Jackson, A Pragmatic Approach to the Phased Consolidation of Financial Regulation in the United States 23−24 (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series,
Paper No. 09-19, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1300431 (discussing regulatory capture in
the financial services industry).
44
Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1, 33 (2010); Henry
T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1463 (1993) (reviewing PETER L. BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS:
THE IMPROBABLE ORIGINS OF MODERN WALL STREET (1992)) (noting the consensus that “regulatory
informational failure” is a serious impediment to effective financial regulation).
45
Henry T.C. Hu, Swaps, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation and the Vulnerability of a
Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 399 (1989) (describing the fragmentation of legal and
political authority that makes regulation difficult in the face of financial innovation).
46
See infra text accompanying note 224.
47
See Raghuram Rajan, Cycle-Proof Regulation, ECONOMIST, Apr. 11, 2009, at 79, available at
http://www.economist.com/businessfinance/displayStory.cfm?story_id=13446173.
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II. PAY FOR PERFORMANCE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
Commentators have decried the role of perverse managerial incentives
in precipitating the financial crisis.48 As a prelude to the detailed presentation of my proposal, this Part offers a short history of banker pay for performance leading up to the crisis. Two parallel decades-long trends—the
steady march of banking deregulation and the rise of equity-based performance pay generally—help to explain the evolution toward the highpowered equity incentives for bankers that we observe pre-crisis.
For bank managers, standard equity-based incentive pay may encourage excessive risk taking that is inimical to the public interest in bank safety
and soundness. Aligning managers’ interests more closely with those of
bank equity holders exacerbates the moral hazard that accompanies deposit
insurance. It gives bankers a personal stake in the unlimited upside that
they might potentially enjoy from high-risk, high-return strategies49—an
approach that bank regulators typically wish to discourage.50
An understanding of how we arrived at this state of affairs offers useful
context for formulating policy going forward.
A. Pay for Performance for Shareholders
Standard corporate governance arrangements such as fiduciary duties
and shareholder voting are generally designed to align managers’ decisionmaking with the interests of the firm’s equity holders,51 who are generally
viewed as the firm’s “owners.”52 Similarly, pay for performance—typically
in the form of equity or equity-based options—intends to overcome manag48

See, e.g., Judith F. Samuelson & Lynn A. Stout, Opinion, Are Executives Paid Too Much?, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 26, 2009, at A13 (decrying the role of badly designed executive compensation plans in encouraging the managerial “short-termism” that led to the financial crisis); Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note 3.
49
Kose John & Yiming Qian, Incentive Features in CEO Compensation in the Banking Industry,
FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 109, 110 (“[H]igher pay-performance sensitivity in management compensation aggravates the well-known risk-shifting incentives associated with risky debt.”).
50
One set of commentators even argues that pay–performance sensitivity should be accounted for in
the pricing of deposit insurance. See John, Saunders & Senbet, supra note 21.
51
Jonathan Macey and Maureen O’Hara have suggested broadening fiduciary duties for bank directors to include creditors along with shareholders as beneficiaries. In particular, they propose that bank
directors consider solvency risk “explicitly and systematically” in their decisionmaking, upon pain of
personal liability for failing to do so. Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, The Corporate Governance of Banks, FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 91, 92. This approach may be problematic,
however. Duties to multiple constituents may render bank managers accountable to no one. See Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive
Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 31–36 (1991) (arguing that other
constituency statutes merely render managers accountable to no one). More generally, corporate duties
seem to be a rather blunt device for regulating risk taking and may invite 20/20 hindsight litigation in the
aftermath of a bank failure.
52
N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007) (referring to shareholders as the “owners” of the corporation).
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ers’ shirking and risk aversion in order to align their incentives with shareholders’ more risk-preferring interests.53
The pay-for-performance movement of the 1990s led boards of directors and their compensation consultants to adopt equity-based compensation
schemes.54 Tax code changes abetted this trend.55 As a result of these
changes,56 the percentage of executive compensation in the form of equity
jumped from 37% in 1993 to 55% in 2003 for the top five executives of the
S&P 500 firms.57 Pay–performance sensitivity for CEOs—typically measured by the change in CEO wealth for every $1000 change in shareholder
wealth58—increased more than tenfold between 1980 and 1999.59
Consistent with the finance canon, however, a greater managerial focus
on improving shareholder returns means riskier investment strategies that
place more risk on creditors.60 Whether pay for performance has been gen-

53

Managers with firm-specific human capital investments in their firm might be reluctant to pursue
risky but potentially profitable projects. Their undiversifiable human capital investments make them
imperfect agents for diversified shareholders. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 99−100 (1991); M. Todd Henderson, Paying CEOs in
Bankruptcy: Executive Compensation When Agency Costs Are Low, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1543, 1549
(2007). With only fixed compensation, managers may also be tempted to build empires, since pay is
typically associated with firm size. Henderson, supra.
54
See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 1 (2006); Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, The State of
U.S. Corporate Governance: What’s Right and What’s Wrong?, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Spring 2003, at
8, 12 (describing the rise of equity-based pay from the 1980s to the 1990s).
55
Since 1994, only the first million dollars of non-performance-based compensation for public
company executives is deductible. I.R.C. § 162(m) (2006). Ironically, these tax law changes were intended to curb total executive pay, but this plan has not worked out as intended. See Gregg D. Polsky,
Controlling Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 916−20
(2007) (arguing that § 162(m) has led to higher executive compensation and lower shareholder wealth,
contrary to its original intent).
56
Evidence suggests that the enactment of § 162(m) has reduced salaries and increased pay–
performance sensitivity. See Tod Perry & Marc Zenner, Pay for Performance? Government Regulation
and the Structure of Compensation Contracts, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 453, 456 (2001).
57
Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON.
POL’Y 283, 289, 290 tbl.4 (2005).
58
See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives,
98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 226 (1990) (applying the typical pay–performance sensitivity analysis).
59
Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 54, at 12.
60
See supra note 32 and accompanying text; see also Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 336 (explaining owner’s incentive to shift risk to bondholders and redistribute wealth from them to himself).
One study found, for example, that bond return premiums increase with managerial ownership. See
Elizabeth Strock Bagnani et al., Managers, Owners, and the Pricing of Risky Debt: An Empirical Analysis, 49 J. FIN. 453, 454 (1994) (finding that among Fortune 500 companies managerial ownership of between 5% and 25% is associated with higher bond return premiums). Bondholders understand that
managers more closely aligned with shareholder interests will tend to adopt riskier investment strategies
in pursuit of higher shareholder returns. Because this increases risk to bondholders, rational bondholders demand higher premiums for this risk. Id. at 455−56.
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erally good for shareholders is the subject of some debate.61 Nonetheless,
compensation for bank officers before the financial crisis tracked the same
basic shareholder-based incentive framework, and managers’ equity stakes
have been shown to be significantly correlated with bank returns and risk.62
B. The Evolution of Incentive Pay for Bankers
Banking deregulation and performance incentives for bank management have more or less gone hand in hand since the late 1970s. This is consistent with more general empirical and theoretical work showing an
inverse relation between regulation and pay–performance sensitivity.63
Within and across regulated industries, regulation has been associated with
lower pay–performance sensitivity in executive compensation,64 and pay–
performance sensitivity has generally increased with deregulation.65
A prevailing agency theory explanation is that deregulation facilitates
competition, and that this competition creates growth opportunities within
the deregulated industry and increases managerial discretion.66 In this environment, investors may prefer to offer managers more powerful performance incentives for risk taking in pursuit of these new growth
opportunities.67 At the same time, greater growth options make monitoring
61

For critical views, see BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 54, at 121−22, which argues that corporate
governance failures have enabled managers to enrich themselves under the guise of pay for performance, and Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating: The Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay,
92 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1888 (1992), which reviews GRAEF CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS (1991)
and considers the difficulties of implementing effective pay for performance.
62
See Anthony Saunders et al., Ownership Structure, Deregulation, and Bank Risk Taking, 45 J.
FIN. 643, 653 (1990) (finding a positive association between bank risk taking and managerial stock
ownership); see also Fahlenbrach & Stulz, supra note 5 (finding some evidence that better alignment of
CEO incentives with shareholder interests has been associated with worse firm performance in the credit
crisis).
63
See supra notes 58−60 and accompanying text.
64
See, e.g., Paul Joskow et al., Regulatory Constraints on CEO Compensation, BROOKINGS PAPERS
ON ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS, no. 1, 1993, at 1, 2−3 (showing lower levels of CEO pay and
lower pay–performance sensitivity for regulated firms than for unregulated firms); Clifford W. Smith, Jr.
& Ross L. Watts, The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend, and Compensation Policies, 32 J. FIN. ECON. 263 (1992) (using industry-level data from 1965 to 1985 to show that
firms in regulated industries—insurance, banking, and gas and electric utilities—have lower executive
compensation than those in unregulated industries and make less use of stock and bonus plans).
65
See R. Glenn Hubbard & Darius Palia, Executive Pay and Performance: Evidence from the U.S.
Banking Industry, 39 J. FIN. ECON. 105 (1995) (finding a positive association between bank CEO pay
and firm performance in the 1980s and a stronger association in deregulated markets); see also Stacey R.
Kole & Kenneth M. Lehn, Deregulation and the Adaptation of Governance Structure: The Case of the
U.S. Airline Industry, 52 J. FIN. ECON. 79, 100 (1999) (finding that the value of airline CEO stock option
grants increased after deregulation and that this impact of deregulation increased over time).
66
See Smith & Watts, supra note 64, at 274–76.
67
See Vicente Cuñat & Maria Guadalupe, Executive Compensation and Competition in the Banking
and Financial Sectors, 33 J. BANKING & FIN. 495, 496 (2009); Michael Raith, Competition, Risk, and
Managerial Incentives, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1425, 1432 (2003).
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more difficult for outsider directors and shareholders, so incentive compensation is relied upon to bond managers to shareholder interests.68 In the
banking industry, deregulation has led to significant increases in growth
opportunities, so it makes sense that increased pay–performance sensitivity
accompanied the deregulation that occurred over the last four decades.
States began to deregulate intrastate branching and interstate banking
in the late 1970s.69 Before this deregulation, commercial banking was a relatively clubby, cozy business, with banks operating in fairly protected, geoNot only was interstate banking
graphically segmented markets.70
prohibited,71 but also most states limited the size and geographical scope of
banks operating within their borders.72 These constraints effectively limited
the territorial scope of competition, carving up banking markets within each
state. At the start of banking deregulation, only twelve states allowed unrestricted branching.73 However, by 1990, thirty-eight states and the District
of Columbia had removed all intrastate branching restrictions.74

68

Smith & Watts, supra note 64, at 275–76; see Jonathan Eaton & Harvey S. Rosen, Agency, Delayed Compensation, and the Structure of Executive Remuneration, 38 J. FIN. 1489, 1498 (1983) (explaining that firms prefer to incentivize executives with stock options when the executives enjoy wide
discretion and are difficult to monitor).
69
Anthony J. Crawford et al., Bank CEO Pay-Performance Relations and the Effects of Deregulation, 68 J. BUS. 231, 233 (1995) (noting that most states required reciprocity); see also Hubbard & Palia,
supra note 65, at 109 (describing state-level deregulation of interstate banking beginning in the early
1980s).
70
Consistent with agency theory, incentive pay was small relative to fixed compensation. Growth
opportunities were relatively few, so there was little need to spur risk taking with incentive compensation. See, e.g., Crawford et al., supra note 69, at 236, 241 (finding no statistically significant relation
between CEO salary and bonus and shareholder wealth and no statistically significant pay–performance
sensitivity of CEO option holdings prior to deregulation); Joel F. Houston & Christopher James, CEO
Compensation and Bank Risk: Is Compensation in Banking Structured to Promote Risk Taking?, 36 J.
MONETARY ECON. 405, 407 (1995) (finding lower bank CEO stock holdings and less reliance on optionbased compensation than in other industries, reflecting differences in investment opportunities, for banks
from 1980 to 1990). This all changed with deregulation, which brought increased competition to commercial banking, as well as more performance-based pay for bank executives and increased pay–
performance sensitivity. See Hubbard & Palia, supra note 65, at 108 (noting that increased competition
from bank deregulation requires a more capable CEO and higher and more responsive pay). See generally Crawford et al., supra note 69 (investigating bank CEO compensation from 1976 to 1988); Cuñat &
Guadalupe, supra note 67 (testing effects of banking deregulation from 1992 to 2002); Hubbard & Palia,
supra note 65 (examining bank CEO pay in the 1980s).
71
States enjoyed the power to block interstate banking under the Douglas Amendment to the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956, which barred a BHC from acquiring a bank outside its home state without the approval of the target bank’s state. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (2006).
72
Kevin J. Stiroh & Philip E. Strahan, Competitive Dynamics of Deregulation: Evidence from U.S.
Banking, 35 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 801, 806 (2003). In “unit” banking states, branching was
strictly prohibited. In effect, each bank was permitted only one place of business—its unit bank—within
the state. Other states allowed only limited branching. Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 808 tbl.1.
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Interstate banking received a boost at the federal level in 1982: an
amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act75 sanctioned interstate acquisition of failed banks and thrifts regardless of state law.76 Many states
responded to the Act by entering into reciprocal multistate agreements freely allowing bank acquisitions among participant states. By 1989, forty-four
states and the District of Columbia allowed some interstate banking.77
Continuing this trend, the Riegle–Neal Act (RNA) formally unleashed
interstate banking across all states in 1994.78 Then in 1999, the Gramm–
Leach–Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act (GLB Act) formally
repealed the Depression-era barriers among banking, insurance, and securities activities.79 This allowed the formation of multiline financial services
firms in the form of bank holding companies.80 These important deregulatory statutes pushed commercial banks further out of their cozy protected
markets,81 forcing them not only to compete with one another across state
lines82 but also to compete with diversified financial firms with insurance
and securities businesses as well as traditional commercial banking.

75

12 U.S.C. § 1842.
Garn–St. Germain Depository Institutions Act (Garn–St. Germain Act) of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97320, § 116, 96 Stat. 1469, 1476–79 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823); see also Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, What Drives Deregulation? Economics and Politics of the Relaxation of Bank Branching
Restrictions, 114 Q.J. ECON. 1437, 1442 (1999) (describing the impact of the Garn–St. Germain Act).
The range of permissible products that depository institutions could offer was broadened beginning in
1980. For example, DIDMCA preempted state usury laws capping mortgage interest rates, finance
charges, and discount points. DIDMCA, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 501, 94 Stat. 161, 161–63 (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1735f-7a). The Garn–St. Germain Act authorized depository institutions to offer money market deposit accounts. Garn–St. Germain Act § 327 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3503) (directing the Deposit
Institutions Deregulation Committee to promulgate rules allowing depository institutions to offer a new
deposit account “directly equivalent to and competitive with money market mutual finds”). The Garn–
St. Germain Act also preempted state law restrictions on due-on-sale clauses. Garn–St. Germain Act
§ 341 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(b)(1)).
77
Stiroh & Strahan, supra note 72, at 808 tbl.1.
78
Riegle–Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-328,
108 Stat. 2338 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
79
Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999).
80
Id. Before the GLB Act, BHC structures were permitted through the regulatory discretion of federal banking regulators. Jonathan R. Macey, The Business of Banking: Before and After Gramm–
Leach–Bliley, 25 J. CORP. L. 691, 692 (2000). Perhaps the most significant effect of the GLB Act was
to allow investment banks to acquire commercial banks. Id. at 694. Commercial banks were already
being allowed by regulators to acquire investment banking operations by the time of the GLB Act’s passage. Id.
81
See Cuñat & Guadalupe, supra note 67, at 497.
82
On the heels of the RNA, the total number of bank branches per capita in the United States increased, as did the average number of banks operating at the state level and the average number of states
in which a bank operated. See Astrid A. Dick, Nationwide Branching and Its Impact on Market Structure, Quality, and Bank Performance, 79 J. BUS. 567, 585 (2006).
76
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Deregulation had salutary procompetitive effects,83 and empirical studies bear out the agency theory predictions for banker compensation discussed earlier. Increased competition led to greater growth opportunities in
commercial banking, and shareholders wished to incentivize their managers
to pursue these opportunities.84 Pay–performance sensitivity for bank CEOs
increased significantly.85
Studies show that bank managers performed better with higher insider
stock ownership in the 1980s, especially in deregulated markets.86 Consistent with agency theory, however, and borne out by subsequent experience
in the recent financial crisis, studies of past deregulatory periods show that
risk taking may also be exacerbated in less regulated markets when bank directors and officers own large equity stakes,87 especially when the banks are
under financial stress.88
83

The costs and pricing of banking services fell. See Jith Jayaratne & Philip E. Strahan, Entry Restrictions, Industry Evolution, and Dynamic Efficiency: Evidence from Commercial Banking, 41 J.L. &
ECON. 239, 249–53 (1998). States that dismantled intrastate branching restrictions saw faster growth
after deregulation. See Jith Jayaratne & Philip E. Strahan, The Finance-Growth Nexus: Evidence from
Bank Branch Deregulation, 111 Q.J. ECON. 639, 639 (1996). Interstate competition also led to reallocation of assets to more efficient banks. See Stiroh & Strahan, supra note 72, at 804.
84
Crawford et al., supra note 69, at 232–33.
85
Id. at 232 (finding significant increases in pay–performance sensitivity changes as to salary plus
bonus, stock options, and stock ownership between 1976 and 1988); Cuñat & Guadalupe, supra note 67,
at 496−97 (investigating the 1992 to 2002 period); Elijah Brewer III et al., Deregulation and the Relationship Between Bank CEO Compensation and Risk-Taking 20−21 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi. Working Paper No. 2003-32, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=486985 (finding a significant
increase in the equity-based component of executive pay following the RNA).
For example, relative to other financial company executives, following the passage of the RNA,
commercial bank executives enjoyed an additional 36¢ increase in option value for every $1000 increase
in shareholder value. Cuñat & Guadalupe, supra note 67, at 503. After the GLB Act’s passage, pay–
performance sensitivity for financial executives’ total pay saw a marginal increase of 24% relative to
executive pay in nonfinancial service sectors, which amounted to an additional 6¢ in total pay for every
dollar increase in shareholder wealth. Id. at 502. While total pay increased only marginally with the
1990s deregulation, its composition changed dramatically. Total fixed compensation fell, but incentive
pay rose, becoming a larger share of total pay. Id. at 501–02. To test for the effects of the RNA, Cuñat
and Guadalupe compared bank executive compensation with a control group of other financial companies both before and after bank deregulation. Id. at 497. With respect to the GLB Act, they compared
financial sector executive compensation with the compensation of executives in the remaining service
sectors in the economy. Id. at 498.
Crawford and his coauthors also found some evidence that CEO pay–performance sensitivity increased more at less well-capitalized banks after deregulation, suggesting more severe moral hazard
problems at these riskier banks. Crawford et al., supra note 69, at 233.
86
Rebel A. Cole & Hamid Mehran, The Effect of Changes in Ownership Structure on Performance:
Evidence from the Thrift Industry, 50 J. FIN. ECON. 291, 301–15 (1998) (measuring stock returns for
publicly traded thrifts that converted from mutual to stock ownership from 1983 to 1987); Hubbard &
Palia, supra note 65, at 108.
87
Ronald C. Anderson & Donald R. Fraser, Corporate Control, Bank Risk Taking, and the Health
of the Banking Industry, 24 J. BANKING & FIN. 1383, 1384 (2000) (finding a positive association between management shareholdings and greater bank-specific risk during the late 1980s, when banks were
relatively less regulated and the industry was under stress); Saunders et al., supra note 62, at 653 (find-
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C. Banker Pay Preceding the Crisis
By the time of the financial crisis, the incentive pay structure for bankers had come to resemble the standard shareholder-wealth-maximizing approach to compensation used in unregulated industries. Bankers’ pay
immediately before the crisis was substantial and mostly performance
based. It was also more equity-laden relative to inside debt than was pay at
nonfinancial firms.
At the end of 2006, total BHC CEO pay averaged $7.8 million, and
less than 10% of it was in the form of fixed salary.89 The rest was performance based.90 Equity-based compensation accounted for just over half of
total CEO pay on average.91 Perhaps more importantly, in addition to annual compensation, these CEOs already held large equity stakes in their
firms. Given their size, these equity portfolios generally have much stronger incentive effects than annual compensation.92 The average BHC CEO’s
equity portfolio was worth $87.5 million in 2006, over ten times larger than
the CEO’s total annual compensation and over twenty times larger than the
value of annual equity-based compensation.93 The average BHC CEO’s
share holdings amounted to 1.6% of the firm’s outstanding shares.94 The

ing greater risk taking in publicly traded banking organizations during the 1979 to 1982 period of relative deregulation when managers held larger equity stakes).
88
Cf. Anderson & Fraser, supra note 87, at 1397.
89
Fahlenbrach & Stulz, supra note 5, at 16 tbl.3.
90
Id. at 15−16. Performance-based pay in Fahlenbrach and Stulz’s study includes both equitybased compensation and cash bonuses for performance achievements. Their sample, constructed from
financial firms with compensation data in Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database, is dominated by
large banks, though a few securities firms are also included. Id. at 14, 25 app.A.2. The median firm has
assets worth $15.5 billion, and the mean asset value is $129.3 billion. Id. at 14.
91
Id. at 16 tbl.3 (showing the average CEO’s total compensation to be almost $7.8 million, with average annual stock compensation of $2.65 million and average annual option compensation of $1.61
million).
92
See John Core & Wayne Guay, The Use of Equity Grants to Manage Optimal Equity Incentive
Levels, 28 J. ACCT. & ECON. 151, 152 (1999) (explaining the importance of portfolio incentives and
showing that firms structure annual equity grants to optimize managers’ portfolio incentives); Brian J.
Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?, 113 Q.J. ECON. 653, 654 (1998)
(finding a strong relationship between pay and performance for public company CEOs from 1980 to
1994 and that virtually all pay–performance sensitivity was attributable to changes in the value of
CEOs’ equity portfolios).
93
Fahlenbrach & Stulz, supra note 5, at 16 tbl.3. Twenty-one of the ninety-five CEOs in the sample held equity stakes in their firms worth more than $100 million. Richard Fuld’s equity stakes in
Lehman Brothers exceeded $911 million; James Caynes of Bear Stearns held equity stakes in his firm
exceeding $1 billion. Id. at 17.
94
Id. at 16 tbl.3. Including delta-weighted options, the CEO’s ownership share increased to 2.4%.
That is, for every $1000 increase in shareholder wealth, the CEO’s wealth would increase by $24. Id. at
17. By comparison, John and Qian found average annual CEO share holdings of 1.38% in a sample of
over 600 CEO-years for commercial banks from 1992 to 2000. John & Qian, supra note 49, at 112
tbl.1.
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median BHC CEO also held more equity, less inside debt, and more equity
relative to inside debt than the median CEO for nonfinancial firms.95
Pay statistics mid-crisis are consistent with this picture. As of June
2008—in the lull between Bear Stearns’s collapse in March and the traumatic few weeks of September when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy
and Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and AIG were taken over by the government96—BHC CEO compensation remained equity-fueled and generous.
Among twenty-four of the largest bank holding companies, annual CEO
compensation ranged as high as $73 million, with ten CEOs making in
excess of $10 million.97 As shown in Figure 1, CEOs of seventeen of these
BHCs received over half of their total compensation in the form of incentive pay.98 The average percentage of incentive pay for the group was
61.4% of total compensation, with the median at 70.5%.
FIGURE 1
BANK CEO PERCENTAGE INCENTIVE COMPENSATION, JUNE 2008
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Tung & Wang, supra note 14, at 21.
Douglas W. Diamond & Anil K. Kashyap, The F.A.Q.’s of Lehman and A.I.G.: A Guest Post,
FREAKONOMICS BLOG (Sept. 18, 2008, 10:04 AM), http://www.freakonomics.com/2008/09/18/diamondand-kashyap-on-the-recent-financial-upheavals.
97
Richard Shaw, Bank Executive Compensation and the Bailout, SEEKING ALPHA (July 20, 2008),
http://seekingalpha.com/article/85806-bank-executive-compensation-and-the-bailout (citing data from
The Corporate Library, June 2008). The bank holding companies were the constituents of Keefe
Bruyette & Woods’s Large Bank Index as of June 2008. Id.
98
Id.
96
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D. Post-Crisis Pay Constraints
Though bank regulators have enjoyed the explicit authority to regulate
bankers’ pay in order to guard against excessive risk taking since 1991,99
this authority was seldom used before the financial crisis and never targeted
at the large money center banks that have been the focus of the financial
crisis.100 With its Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP),101 the Treasury
Department attempted to rein in some of the perceived excess at firms receiving TARP aid, though TARP rules only vaguely addressed the perverse
risk-taking incentives at work.
These rules imposed both corporate governance changes and substantive constraints on pay structure, including prohibitions on golden parachute
payments and on compensation that encourages “unnecessary and excessive
risks.”102 In addition, the Treasury Department appointed Kenneth Feinberg
to serve as a special master to oversee pay packages at TARP recipient in-

99

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1831p-1(c)(1)(A) (2006), empowers regulators to take enforcement action against compensation practices that might be unsafe or unsound banking practices, see infra note 220 and accompanying text, including not only compensation that is excessive but also compensation that creates incentives for
excessive risk taking. Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Who Determines When Enough Is Enough? Refocusing Regulatory Limitations on Banks’ Compensation Practices, 37 B.C. L. REV. 861, 867–68 (1996).
Even before 1991, regulators might deem excessive compensation an unsafe or unsound banking practice. See infra note 220.
100
At one level, this historical lack of intervention is not surprising. When institutions are profitable and the economy is growing, regulatory tinkering with executive compensation is politically difficult. Others have noted these cyclicality problems and called for countercyclical approaches to
regulation. See, e.g., Rajan, supra note 47, at 79. As this financial crisis has taught us, bank executive
compensation is an especially important place to start thinking about countercyclical regulation.
101
In the immediate aftermath of government takeovers at Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and AIG and
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
(EESA) in October 2008. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008). EESA authorized the Treasury
Department to spend $700 billion to shore up the nation’s financial system, pursuant to which the Treasury Department devised TARP. The following February, Congress enacted the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, which amended EESA by
imposing significant new restrictions on executive compensation for firms receiving TARP financial assistance. Pursuant to ARRA authorization, both the Treasury Department and the Securities and Exchange Commission promulgated rules implementing ARRA’s executive compensation restrictions.
102
ARRA § 7001 (describing executive compensation limits). A golden parachute is a generous
severance arrangement. The rules also limit bonus payments, retention awards, and incentive compensation to CEOs and other highly compensated employees. TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, 74 Fed. Reg. 28,394 (June 15, 2009). For example, incentive compensation is required
to be in the form of restricted stock that does not vest until government loans are repaid. Id. at 28,401.
Tax gross-ups for highly compensated employees are also prohibited. Id. at 28,402. With a tax grossup, the employer firm covers its employee’s income tax liabilities relating to her compensation. The
rules also require that the firm’s compensation committee conduct a semiannual review of employee
compensation plans to assess the risks posed to the institution. Id. at 28,403.
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stitutions.103 Feinberg slashed cash salaries in favor of long-term stock
grants.104
The Federal Reserve proposed much broader but similarly structured
oversight of all incentive compensation arrangements at all of its regulated
institutions105 and not just TARP recipients. Most recently, Congress
enacted the Dodd–Frank Act, legislating new regulatory attention to financial institutions’ incentive pay arrangements.106 Pursuant to the Act, banking regulators issued guidelines for financial institutions prohibiting
incentive pay arrangements that encourage inappropriate risk and requiring
new disclosures concerning the structure of incentive pay.107
103

Feinberg’s primary role is to monitor compensation practices at firms receiving “exceptional financial assistance,” namely AIG, Bank of America, Citigroup, General Motors Co., GMAC Inc., Chrysler Group LLC, and Chrysler Financial. Recently, he nixed the multimillion-dollar pay package of Ken
Lewis, the retiring CEO of Bank of America, and slashed the salaries of hundreds of other employees in
these seven firms. Deborah Solomon & Dan Fitzpatrick, Pay Slashed at Bailout Firms, WALL ST. J,
Oct. 22, 2009, at A1.
104
Steven Brill, What’s a Bailed-Out Banker Worth?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2009, § MM, at 32, 34;
Solomon & Fitzpatrick, supra note 103 (describing cash salary cap of $500,000 and the use of “salary
stock” that cannot be sold for at least four years). Recently, Feinberg approved a plan to pay AIG executives with “long term performance units,” whose value depends 80% on the market value of AIG’s
junior debt and 20% on its common stock value. Serena Ng, AIG Changes Pay Plan for Its Stars, WALL
ST. J., June 24, 2010, at C1. Unlike my proposal, the purpose of Feinberg’s debt-based compensation is
not to reduce executives’ risk taking but rather to insulate their compensation from the volatility of
AIG’s stock price. Id.
105
Proposed Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,227 (Oct. 27,
2009). Bank holding companies are the major institutions regulated by the Federal Reserve. The largest
banks are owned by bank holding companies. According to the proposed guidance, incentive compensation at banking organizations should:
•
•
•

Provide employees incentives that do not encourage excessive risk-taking beyond the organization’s ability to effectively identify and manage risk;
Be compatible with effective controls and risk management; and
Be supported by strong corporate governance, including active and effective oversight by
the organization’s board of directors.

Id. at 55,228. Concurrent with its issuance of this new guidance on compensation, the Federal Reserve
announced a supervisory initiative to review pay practices at all of its regulated entities. Id. at 55,229.
The G-20 group of important industrial and developing countries has also endorsed a set of compensation guidelines for financial institutions issued by the Financial Stability Board, a coalition of national
financial authorities and international financial institutions. FIN. STABILITY BD., FSB PRINCIPLES FOR
SOUND COMPENSATION PRACTICES: IMPLEMENTATION STANDARDS (2006), available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_090925c.pdf.
106
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 956,
124 Stat. 1376, 1905–06 (2010). In addition to bankers’ pay, the Dodd–Frank Act imposed significant
new rules on public company executive compensation generally, requiring among other things “say on
pay”—a shareholder vote on executives’ compensation and any golden parachute arrangements, id.
§ 951; compensation committee independence and direct responsibility over compensation consultants,
id. § 952; and clawback provisions relating to incentive compensation awarded based on erroneous accounting later required to be restated for material noncompliance with financial reporting requirements,
id. § 954.
107
Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36,395 (June 25, 2010).
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While these government efforts constrain or prohibit certain pay practices felt to be most egregious in terms of enabling either too much pay or
excessive risk taking, many of the prescriptions are vague, and on the
whole, they lack a positive theory for what banker pay should look like.
The next Part discusses my approach.
III. PAYING FOR LESS RISKY PERFORMANCE
Though the idea of pay for performance is decades old, until recently its
only application had been to incentivize managers to improve shareholder
returns. Since the recent financial crisis, however, it has become clear that
the structure of banker pay has consequences for bank risk regulation.
Bank examination and supervision, as well as capital requirements, impose
important limits on bank risk taking and help assure bank solvency. However, these approaches are incomplete because they do not directly address
managerial incentives.108 Instead of relying solely on these external influences, regulators may be able to bond bankers to more prudent banking
practices with pay–performance incentives that include risk-sensitive instruments. At the same time, regulatory attention to the structure of management incentives may offer an important tool to enable more efficient
tradeoffs between risk taking and regulation.
I propose to constrain bank risk taking by paying bankers in part with
their banks’ public subordinated debt securities. Empirical research shows
that as the proportion of a CEO’s wealth held in the form of firm debt increases relative to the value of her equity holdings, risk taking declines. Including debt in bankers’ pay arrangements and making debt a greater share
of their personal portfolios would reduce bankers’ risk-taking incentives.
The presence of this debt shifts bankers’ personal interests away from riskpreferring equity, aligning their interests more closely with relatively riskaverse debtholders.109 This alignment also furthers regulators’ interest in
assuring banks’ safety and soundness.110 Publicly traded subordinated debt
securities are ideal for this task because the trading price will operate as a
108

See John, Saunders & Senbet, supra note 21, at 97.
“Top management should . . . be given incentives to act on behalf of debtholders to an adequate
degree. . . . [P]roviding managers with compensation structures that have low pay-performance sensitivity may be optimal.” John & Qian, supra note 49, at 110.
Such compensation would admittedly dissuade bank executives from the traditional pursuit of value
for shareholders, which is sometimes viewed as corporate managers’ exclusive goal. This should not
give us much pause, however. Bank governance has traditionally been recognized as presenting special
concerns that deserve special governance tools. See supra notes 27, 51 and accompanying text.
110
Perfect alignment of course may not necessarily be desirable; regulators might be perfectly happy with low-risk, low-growth strategies that might be socially suboptimal. Too much debt in managers’
compensation packages may make them suboptimally risk averse, reducing long-term value. Rangarajan K. Sundaram & David L. Yermack, Pay Me Later: Inside Debt and Its Role in Managerial Compensation, 62 J. FIN. 1551, 1553 (2007); David I. Walker, The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term
Focus of Executive Pay, 51 B.C. L. REV. 435, 446–47 (2010).
109

1226

105:1205 (2011)

Pay for Banker Performance

continuing referendum on risk taking at the bank. Market pricing of this
debt will be particularly sensitive to downside risk, so its presence in bankers’ personal portfolios will give bankers direct personal incentives to avoid
excessive risk.
I first discuss recent learning on the effects of inside debt holdings on
managerial risk taking. I next explain the use of sub debt for market discipline, describing its appropriate features. These sections provide the background for Part IV, which describes Bhagat and Romano’s and Bebchuk
and Spamann’s recent banker pay proposals and compares these approaches
with mine.
A. Inside Debt Compensation
Conventional wisdom holds that corporate managers’ pay comes in two
basic forms—cash and equity-based compensation111—and that managers
do not hold inside debt—the debt of their own firms.112 Recent research
shows, however, that managers in fact do hold significant amounts of inside
debt in the form of pensions and deferred compensation.113 These fixed aspects of executive compensation serve to some extent as debt-like compensation, since fixed compensation by definition promises a return that does
not vary with firm performance. Instead, these forms of compensation give
managers fixed claims against the firm.
These inside debt holdings can be substantial. By the time Jack Welch
retired as the CEO of General Electric in 2001, the present value of his
pension benefits plus deferred compensation was estimated to have exceeded $109 million.114 Also at the end of 2006, at least seven public company CEOs held inside debt balances in excess of $100 million.115 In one
sample of Fortune 500 CEOs, the pension component of total compensation
for CEOs aged sixty-one to sixty-five was 40% larger on average than their
base salary and equaled 23% of equity compensation.116
Though the possibility of including debt in executives’ compensation
arrangements has been largely ignored until quite recently,117 a nascent body
of literature offers strong preliminary support for the proposition that holding fixed claims against the firm may dampen CEOs’ risk-taking incen-

111

Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 110, at 1551.
Alex Edmans & Qi Liu, Inside Debt, 15 REV. FIN. 75, 75–76 (2011).
113
Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 110, at 1552; Chenyang Wei & David Yermack, Investor
Reactions to CEOs’ Inside Debt Incentives, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 3813 (2011).
114
Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 110, at 1552.
115
Wei & Yermack, supra note 113, at 48.
116
Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 110, at 1554.
117
Id. at 1551 (“Implicit in virtually all of this [executive compensation] research is the assumption
that managerial compensation consists of only two components, namely, cash and equity-linked instruments.”).
112
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tives.118 Alex Edmans and Qi Liu show theoretically that inside debt may
be part of an optimal compensation arrangement.119 While equity compensation incentivizes managers to exert more effort—thereby addressing the
agency costs of equity—inside debt counters the risk-shifting incentives
that accompany equity compensation, thereby reducing the agency costs of
debt.120 Giving managers a stake in the value of the firm’s debt makes them
less willing to sacrifice its value to benefit shareholders. This is especially
important when the firm is in distress. Debt compensation can improve
managerial effort and firm value in distress situations because, unlike equity, debt is sensitive to the firm’s liquidation value. That is, debtholders may
still recover value when the firm is in distress. By contrast, equity is worthless once the firm is insolvent.121 Managers holding inside debt may therefore be less inclined to make risky bets when the firm gets into trouble.122
Especially for firms with high leverage—like banks—a high probability of
default, and other severe risk-shifting incentives, debt may be an important
component of optimal executive compensation.123
Empirical evidence also supports the idea that inside debt may dampen
managers’ risk-taking incentives. Several studies focus on CEO pensions
and deferred compensation, recognizing these as forms of inside debt.
Rangarajan Sundaram and David Yermack find that as the value of a CEO’s
pension increases relative to the value of her equity holdings, risk taking
declines.124 The effect is especially strong when the CEO’s debt–equity ra-

118

See Edmans & Liu, supra note 112; Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 110, at 1580–83; Joseph
Gerakos, CEO Pensions: Disclosure, Managerial Power, and Optimal Contracting 23 (Pension Research Council, Working Paper No. 2007-5, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=982180 (finding a positive association between the presence of pension benefits and higher quality debt ratings,
suggesting that pension benefits may reduce risk taking).
119
Edmans & Liu, supra note 112, at 78.
120
While Jensen and Meckling consider the agency costs of equity and debt separately, see Jensen
& Meckling, supra note 1, at 312, Edmans and Liu consider them simultaneously, thereby enabling
analysis of the tradeoffs between incentivizing managerial effort and influencing investment choice, see
Edmans & Liu, supra note 112, at 79 & n.5.
121
Equity holders are indifferent to the firm’s liquidation value because that value goes to pay creditors. So while equity-based compensation gives managers an incentive to avoid insolvency, it may also
induce them to “inefficiently sacrifice liquidation value to gamble for solvency” when a firm is in distress. Edmans & Liu, supra note 112, at 77. Debtholders will be less sanguine about squandering value
on desperate investment strategies because their returns are fixed; they will not share in any (low probability but) stupendous returns beyond the fixed amount of their claims. Id.
122
The appropriate amount of debt depends on the relative magnitudes of the two different types of
agency problems—shirking versus risk shifting. Id.
123
The appropriate amount of debt increases with leverage, the probability of default, and the manager’s ability to affect liquidation values, while debt is reduced with increasing growth opportunities.
See id. at 77–78.
124
Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 110, at 1555. Sundaram and Yermack use “distance-todefault” as their measure of firm risk—basically the number of standard deviation decreases in firm value that would be required to put the firm in default. Id. They regress fixed effects panel data models
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tio exceeds her firm’s debt–equity ratio.125 Chenyang Wei and David Yermack find evidence that investors expect firm managers to manage more
conservatively as their inside debt holdings increase.126 Wei and Yermack
examine the reaction of public debt and equity markets to new disclosures
on the value of CEOs’ pensions and deferred compensation in 2007.127
They find that when the CEO’s inside debt–equity ratio exceeds her firm’s,
the disclosure triggers a wealth transfer from equity holders to debtholders.128 Bond prices rise, while equity prices fall.129 In addition, the price volatility drops for both debt and equity.130 These market reactions are
consistent with the idea that investors expect managers to run their firms
more conservatively—taking less risk—when they hold large inside debt
positions.
Most recently, Xue Wang and I tested the effects of inside debt specifically in the context of the recent financial crisis. We show that inside debt–
equity ratios for BHC CEOs at the end of 2006 were positively associated
with better BHC performance during the crisis and negatively associated
with BHC risk taking.131
This recent literature on the effects of CEO debt holdings nicely frames
the potential benefits of including publicly traded subordinated debt in
bankers’ pay packages and personal portfolios. Inside debt seems a natural
corrective for the unique moral hazard and risk-taking inducements for
bankers that derive from high leverage, equity incentives, and deposit insurance. With subordinated, publicly traded debt, market actors will continually assess banks’ default risk and price the debt accordingly. Bankers
will then see the real-time results of this continuing referendum on their risk
taking in the value of their personal portfolios.
B. Market Discipline through Public Subordinated Debt
Subordinated debt securities improve on executive pensions and deferred compensation as an incentive device because subordinated debt, or
with separate intercepts for each unique CEO–firm pair. Id. at 1581; see also Gerakos, supra note 118,
at 23 (finding a positive association between pensions and debt ratings).
125
When a CEO’s debt–equity ratio exceeds her firm’s debt–equity ratio, distance-to-default declines by 0.3 to 0.4 standard deviations, which is statistically significant. Sundaram & Yermack, supra
note 110, at 1555.
126
Wei & Yermack, supra note 113, at 3814.
127
Beginning in 2007, the Securities and Exchange Commission began requiring more extensive
executive compensation disclosures, including explicit valuations of officers’ pension benefits and deferred compensation. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(c)(2)(viii) (2007). Prior to the regulation’s implementation,
precise valuation of these items was quite complicated and required the gathering of significant information outside of the firm’s public filings. Wei & Yermack, supra note 113, at 3819.
128
Wei & Yermack, supra note 113, at 3813–14.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 3815.
131
Tung & Wang, supra note 14, at 22–29.
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sub debt, imposes market discipline.132 Sub-debt holders are typically sophisticated institutional investors with the resources and expertise to monitor their borrowers,133 and issuing subordinated debt may impose market
discipline on banks in at least two ways. First, debtholders will contract
with the issuing bank for covenants that constrain the bank’s risk taking.134
Second, the trading price of the subordinated debt is sensitive to the bank’s
risk taking. Sub debt is junior to depositor liabilities, and unlike insured
depositors, sub-debt holders do not enjoy federal insurance against losses or
repayment priority when a bank fails. If the bank were to fail, sub-debt
holders would be repaid only after the repayment of all depositors—
including uninsured depositors—and general creditors.135 Therefore, in the
face of real trouble, debtholders may either act to enforce their covenants—
typically a very public maneuver—or they may sell. In either case, information is made public.
The market for subordinated bank debt is well established,136 and banks
engaging in excessively risky strategies will see their sub-debt trading prices drop.137 Market pricing therefore serves as a transparent and continuing
signal of the riskiness of the bank’s activities. Risk-related price fluctuations will directly affect bankers’ wealth when the debt is included in their
132

The idea of requiring banks to issue public debt securities in order to impose market discipline
on bank risk taking has been the subject of study for several decades. A 1986 study commissioned by
the American Bankers Association recommended a mandatory requirement that banks issue subordinated debt. GEORGE J. BENSTON ET AL., PERSPECTIVES ON SAFE AND SOUND BANKING: PAST, PRESENT,
AND FUTURE 192 (1986). Under the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, a large FDIC member bank wishing to
control a financial subsidiary must have an issue of highly rated debt outstanding. Gramm–Leach–
Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 121, 113 Stat. 1338, 1373 (1999). The GLB Act also commissioned
the Federal Reserve Board and the Treasury Department to study the feasibility of requiring large banks
and bank holding companies to issue subordinated debt as a device to improve market discipline. Id.
§ 108, 113 Stat. at 1361–62; see also Paul Kupiec, Using a Mandatory Subordinated Debt Issuance Requirement to Set Regulatory Capital Requirements for Bank Credit Risks, in CAPITAL ADEQUACY
BEYOND BASEL: BANKING, SECURITIES, AND INSURANCE 146 (Hal S. Scott ed., 2005) (proposing a
mandatory subordinated debt requirement).
133
Robert P. Bartlett III, Going Private but Staying Public: Reexamining the Effect of SarbanesOxley on Firms’ Going-Private Decisions, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 7, 15 (2009); Mark E. Van Der Weide &
Satish M. Kini, Subordinated Debt: A Capital Markets Approach to Bank Regulation, 41 B.C. L. REV.
195, 222 (2000).
134
Van Der Weide & Kini, supra note 133, at 221−22.
135
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(11)(A) (2006).
136
See Laurence H. Meyer, Supervising Large Complex Banking Organizations: Adapting to
Change, in PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION, supra note 37, at 97, 103; infra note 147 and accompanying text.
137
Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D. Wall, Sub-Debt Yield Spreads as Bank Risk Measures, 20 J. FIN.
SERVICES RES. 121, 133−35 (2001) (showing that sub-debt yield spreads perform slightly better than
capital measures as predictors of banks’ financial condition); Mark J. Flannery & Sorin M. Sorescu,
Evidence of Bank Market Discipline in Subordinated Debenture Yields: 1983–1991, 51 J. FIN. 1347,
1373−74 (1996) (demonstrating that bond yields reflect investors’ pricing of bank risk taking); Diana
Hancock & Myron L. Kwast, Using Subordinated Debt to Monitor Bank Holding Companies: Is It
Feasible?, 20 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 147, 147 (2001) (finding that bonds of highest liquidity offer the
most consistent pricing information for purposes of reflecting bank default risk).
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personal portfolios. In this way, the fine reflection of managerial risk taking generates both important incentive and information effects. It will incentivize bank officers to monitor risk carefully; it will also offer a clear
signal to regulators and market participants to give special scrutiny to particular banks.138
Current banking law recognizes that bank subordinated debt may help
harness private market risk assessment to complement regulators’ efforts.
For example, the largest FDIC member banks are required to issue longterm investment grade unsecured debt if they control a financial subsidiary.139 Market discipline, in the form of both market pricing and creditor
enforcement actions, helps to curb regulatory forbearance problems. Current regulatory oversight depends heavily on administrative judgments and
not on market assessments. Regulatory capital rules are based on accounting rules and administrative assessments of risk. Similarly, bank portfolio
supervision turns largely on the administrative discretion of particular bank
supervisors. Regulators may be reluctant to act against an insolvent bank,
either because of political pressure from supporters of the shaky bank140 or
because public action may expose regulators’ past mistakes or lax oversight. Under these conditions, regulators might prefer to wait and see, hoping that the shaky bank will work its own way out of trouble.141 Strong
public indicators of potential default risk, however, may prod regulators into action, as their failure to acknowledge a problem becomes more difficult
to justify to the public.142
Subordinated debt also improves on equity as a form of bank capital
and as a device for market discipline. As bank capital, sub debt cushions
the bank from losses without the perverse incentives that come with equi-

138

Some evidence suggests that subordinated debt does influence managers’ decisionmaking. See
Kose John et al., Outside Monitoring and CEO Compensation in the Banking Industry, 16 J. CORP. FIN.
383, 384 (2010) (finding a statistically significant relation between the degree of sub-debt holder monitoring and pay–performance sensitivity); cf. Robert R. Bliss & Mark J. Flannery, Market Discipline in
the Governance of U.S. Bank Holding Companies: Monitoring Versus Influencing, in PRUDENTIAL
SUPERVISION, supra note 37, at 107, 141 (finding evidence of monitoring but finding inconclusive results regarding influence).
139
Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 121, 113 Stat. 1338, 1373 (1999); see also
William W. Lang & Douglas D. Robertson, Analysis of Proposals for a Minimum Subordinated Debt
Requirement, 54 J. ECON. & BUS. 115, 116 (2002) (discussing differing subordinated debt requirements
for the fifty largest banks controlling a financial subsidiary versus banks ranked fifty-one to one hundred
in size).
140
See George J. Benston & George G. Kaufman, FDICIA After Five Years, 11 J. ECON. PERSP.
139, 140–42 (1997) (describing the lax supervision of savings and loan associations in the 1980s as partially driven by political pressure).
141
Id. at 141–42 (describing regulatory forbearance problems among U.S. bank regulators).
142
See Charles W. Calomiris & Andrew Powell, Can Emerging Market Bank Regulators Establish
Credible Discipline? The Case of Argentina, 1992–99, in PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION, supra note 37, at
147, 157.
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ty.143 Distress-related risk taking, which may include potentially highyielding negative-expected-value bets, may be bad for the stability of the
bank but still good for equity holders. This sort of high-risk gamble is less
a problem with subordinated debt than it is with equity. Because sub debt
enjoys only limited upside, sub-debt holders will not see the same benefit
from risky strategies that equity holders do.144 So sub-debt holders will be
less willing than equity holders to sacrifice firm value on high-risk strategies to return the firm to solvency. For these same reasons, market pricing
of subordinated debt is more sensitive to downside risk than equity is,
which makes subordinated debt a superior device for market discipline.145
Including sub debt in bankers’ pay and portfolios reinforces these advantages of subordinated debt relative to equity.146
C. Features
This section discusses important features of the publicly traded subordinated debt that would be used for banker compensation. The features of
this debt are intended to enhance market discipline on banks, which would
in turn incentivize bankers to avoid excessive risk once their compensation
arrangements and personal wealth include such debt securities. The largest
banks already issue subordinated debt,147 so feasibility is not an issue.148
These banks will be the most important for purposes of cabining systemic
risk, and they are the ones most likely to significantly affect the deposit insurance fund.

143

See Paul Hamalainen, Mandatory Subordinated Debt and the Corporate Governance of Banks,
12 CORP. GOVERNANCE 93, 96 (2004).
144
See supra note 32 and accompanying text. In addition, sub debt has value even when the firm is
insolvent, while equity has nothing left to lose. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
145
See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
146
An overarching caveat deserves mention. The implicit (or explicit) promise of a government
bailout would frustrate attempts at imposing market discipline on banks and their managers. To the extent that debtholders believe that the government will not allow a given financial institution to fail, its
debtholders will price their debt securities accordingly and will have weaker monitoring incentives. See
Flannery & Sorescu, supra note 137, at 1373–74 (finding that bond markets price bank default risk more
carefully as the likelihood of a government rescue decreases). One possible way of addressing this species of moral hazard is to explicitly exclude debtholders by statute as beneficiaries of any future government rescue effort. Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D. Wall, Subordinated Debt as Bank Capital: A
Proposal for Regulatory Reform, 24 ECON. PERSP. 40, 47 (2000).
147
At the end of 1998, forty-five of the fifty largest commercial banks and forty-eight of the fifty
largest bank holding companies had issued subordinated debt. Lang & Robertson, supra note 139, at
124; see also id. at 124, tbls.3 & 4 (breaking down by size the number of banks and bank holding companies that had subordinated debt issues outstanding at the end of 1998).
148
The fine tailoring of the terms of the subordinated debt for purposes of market discipline may be
tricky, however, since the terms of sub-debt issuance are currently driven primarily by bank capital
guidelines, which are not focused primarily on the market-disciplining role of subordinated debt. Evanoff & Wall, supra note 146, at 43–44.
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Bank subordinated debt should have a maturity of at least eight to ten
years.149 The debt should be issued relatively frequently in staggered
tranches,150 with bankers receiving debt from each issue. Bankers should be
required to hold the debt for at least half of its maturity. This structure
should offer continuing incentives for bankers to constrain risk taking at
their banks.
The medium to long term of the debt gives public debtholders the appropriate incentive to police bank risk to assure long-range stability and to
price the debt accordingly.151 Bankers holding the debt would have a similar perspective.
Periodic issuance of new debt would force the bank continually to return to the public capital markets for refinancing, subjecting the bank to
frequent active monitoring by underwriters, investors, and rating agen-

149

Commentators interested in the market-disciplining effects of bank subordinated debt typically
recommend at least a five-year maturity. SILAS KEEHN, BANKING ON THE BALANCE: POWERS AND THE
SAFETY NET 36 (1988); Evanoff & Wall, supra note 146, at 45; Lang & Robertson, supra note 139, at
131.
150
KEEHN, supra note 149; Evanoff & Wall, supra note 148, at 45 (recommending two issues per
year). The proceeds of each issuance would be used to retire some portion of outstanding subordinated
debt. For example, a bank might issue $100 million worth of eight-year bonds every six months. By the
end of year eight, the bank would have $1.6 billion of subordinated debt outstanding, with $100 million
maturing every six months. The proceeds of each new issuance would be used to repay the maturing
tranche of debt.
In terms of the total amount of sub debt outstanding, several studies recommend at least 2% of assets
as a suitable minimum. SHADOW FINANCIAL REGULATORY COMMITTEE, REFORMING BANK CAPITAL
REGULATION 21 (2000) (recommending 2% of assets); Evanoff & Wall, supra note 146, at 45 (recommending at least 3% of risk-weighted assets for the largest twenty-five banks); Hamalainen, supra note
143, at 101 (recommending 2% of risk-weighted assets). Without accounting for risk weighting, it appears that large banks have somewhere in the neighborhood of 2% outstanding in the absence of any
mandate. For example, as of September 30, 2009, JPMorgan Chase Bank had assets of about $1.7 trillion and outstanding subordinated notes and debentures of about $28.5 billion, which amounts to just
under 1.7% of assets. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., CONSOLIDATED REPORTS OF CONDITION AND
INCOME FOR A BANK WITH DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN OFFICES—FFIEC 031, at 10–11 (Sept. 30, 2009)
[hereinafter JPMORGAN REPORT], available at https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/ManageFacsimiles.aspx (Report Type: Call\TFR; Single Date: 9/30/2009; Institution: JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association).
Similarly, as of September 30, 2009, Bank of America, N.A. had assets of $1.46 trillion and subordinated notes and debentures outstanding of $25 billion, which represents 1.7% of assets. BANK OF
AMERICA, N.A., CONSOLIDATED REPORTS OF CONDITION AND INCOME FOR A BANK WITH DOMESTIC
AND FOREIGN OFFICES—FFIEC 031, at 10–11 (Sept. 30, 2009) [hereinafter BANK OF AMERICA
REPORT], available at https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/ManageFacsimiles.aspx (Report Type: Call\TFR; Single Date: 9/30/2009; Institution: Bank of America, National Association). In addition, this amount gives
some assurance of continuing secondary market liquidity, which is important for high quality price signals. Hancock & Kwast, supra note 137, at 152 (noting that issue size, age of issue, whether the issuer
is classified as a large complex banking organization, and overall bond market liquidity all improve the
liquidity of bank subordinated debt).
151
The bank’s ability to retire debt through buybacks or call options should be limited under the
terms of the bond indenture.
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cies.152 So in addition to the medium- to long-term focus driven by the maturity of the bonds, bank managers have incentives toward continual shortterm vigilance in order to keep their borrowing costs low. A bank that takes
on excessive risk will pay higher interest costs when it goes to sell subordinated debt in the public bond markets.153 At the limit, a shaky bank may be
unable to issue new debt at any price,154 which sends a fairly clear market
signal that the bank is in trouble. In effect, frequent issuance of subordinated debt marshals the capital markets to help keep bankers on a short
leash.155
Regular injections of these debt securities into a banker’s portfolio,
along with holding requirements, assures that a banker will always own a
significant amount of inside debt with a medium term to maturity that the
banker cannot sell in the near future.156 These inside debt holdings would
complement the twin goals of the bank’s rolling debt issuance. Holding the
bank’s medium-term debt would encourage bankers to adopt a medium- to
long-term perspective in their decisionmaking. The periodic receipt of
bonds from new debt issues and the regular opportunity to sell would encourage managers’ continuing vigilance regarding risk taking at the bank.
In general, managers would be concerned about maintaining and increasing
the values of their personal portfolios. Including this medium-term public
debt would discourage excessive risk taking by giving managers some incentive to maintain the bank’s medium-term solvency.157
D. Bank-Level Debt to Counter Corporate Structure Effects
The modern BHC structure, in which banks are held as wholly owned
subsidiaries of diversified financial institutions, creates additional sources
of risk to banks. It also informs the structuring of our public subordinated
152

See René Stulz, Does Financial Structure Matter for Economic Growth? A Corporate Finance
Perspective, in ASLI DEMIRGÜÇ-KUNT & ROSS LEVINE, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH: A CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON OF BANKS, MARKETS, AND DEVELOPMENT 143, 170–73
(2001).
153
A bank executive might try to engineer a higher interest rate on the next periodic debt issuance
by increasing bank risk. However, the size of the banker’s existing debt holdings would deter such a
strategy because the market would bid down the value of those existing holdings in the face of the increased risk. Structured properly, the executive would lose more on the value of her existing holdings
than she would gain in terms of the higher interest rate on the new issue. I am indebted to Chuck
Whitehead for pointing out this potential for gaming.
154
Cf. Calomiris & Powell, supra note 142, at 169 (describing the workings of the subordinated
debt requirement in Argentina and the inability of weaker banks to accomplish new issuance).
155
Cf. Mitchell Berlin, Debt Maturity: What Do Economists Say? What Do CFOs Say?, BUS. REV.,
Q1, 2006, at 3, 4 (explaining lenders’ use of short-maturity debt to keep risky firms on a short leash).
156
For example, a banker receiving annual allotments of eight-year bonds that she cannot sell for
four years has a continuing incentive to maintain her bank’s medium-term solvency.
157
Over time, the composition of a banker’s portfolio may create suboptimal incentives because of
earlier sales from the portfolio. Annual incentive pay should be structured to account for existing portfolio incentives and to adjust accordingly. See infra Part IV.C.
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debt requirement: the debt should be issued at the level of the banking subsidiary (the “bank”), and not the BHC. Public bank debt offers a much
crisper market price signal regarding risk taking at the bank than would
BHC debt or other BHC securities. Bank debt pricing therefore better
tracks regulators’ interest in bank safety and soundness and offers better incentives for bankers holding the debt.158
The BHC structure also complicates the task of identifying the bankers
to be targeted with pay regulation. Management structures within BHCs
vary. The CEO and other top officers of a banking subsidiary should clearly be covered by my proposed pay constraints. Holding company officers
may need to be covered as well. Holding company officers typically have
significant influence over policy decisions at banking subsidiaries and may
even be officers of the banking subsidiaries.159 For example, Ken Lewis,
the CEO, Chairman, and President of Bank of America Corporation, the nation’s largest BHC, serves in these same capacities for Bank of America,
N.A.,160 its principal banking subsidiary and the nation’s second-largest
bank.161 When BHC officers wield important influence over a banking subsidiary’s policy decisions, they should be made to hold subordinated debt of
that bank.162
This section considers the effects of BHC structure on banker pay, the
attendant incentives to take risk at the bank, and the use of bank-level subordinated debt as an antidote.

158

This is not to suggest that paying bankers with BHC debt or other securities would not be potentially useful in curbing BHC risk taking. But BHC risk is a different problem from the bank moral hazard and risk taking that comes with deposit insurance, which is the subject of both my proposal and
competing proposals.
159
See Van Der Weide & Kini, supra note 133, at 256 n.202 (noting that bank managers are also often managers of the BHC).
160
Bank of America Corp., supra note 16, at 16.
161
See Bank of America Corporation Financial Reports, IBANKNET, http://www.ibanknet.com/
scripts/callreports/getbank.aspx?ibnid=usa_1073757 (last visited Sept. 30, 2011) (showing Bank of
America, N.A. as the largest banking subsidiary of Bank of America Corporation); Financial Reports of
Leading Banks, IBANKNET, http://www.ibanknet.com/scripts/callreports/fiList.aspx?type=031 (last visited Sept. 30, 2011) (showing Bank of America, N.A. as the second-largest bank by assets, with over
$1.4 trillion in assets).
162
Even if the bank and BHC share no common officers, the bank officers serve at the pleasure of
BHC management, since the BHC controls its banking subsidiaries through its equity ownership. So the
influence of BHC management is likely to be felt keenly at the bank subsidiary level in any event.
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1. Noisy Proxies and Market Discipline.—The market discipline that
publicly traded BHC debt or other securities might impose on banks and
bankers would be weak compared to that imposed by debt issued at the
bank subsidiary level. The trading price of BHC securities would only offer
a noisy proxy for risk taking at its banking subsidiary because the BHC
owns financial institutions in addition to the bank. Take Bank of America,
depicted in Figure 2, as an example. As with most of the largest commercial banks, Bank of America, N.A. is the dominant financial institution
within its holding company group, Bank of America Corporation (BAC).
The bank represents 65% of BAC’s total assets.163
FIGURE 2
BANK OF AMERICA HOLDING COMPANY STRUCTURE
Bank of America Corporation
$2.25 trillion

Bank of America, N.A.
$1.46 trillion
(approx. 65% of BHC assets)

Other Financial Institutions and Assets
$790 billion

Because BAC holds $790 billion in assets outside of its main bank,164
the trading prices of BAC securities reflect only a composite of information
about the bank and the many additional entities comprising the other 35%
of BAC’s assets. By contrast, the trading price of debt issued by the banking subsidiary would offer a more direct signal regarding risk taking at the
bank. Bankers holding the bank’s public debt would therefore have much
greater incentive to focus on the bank’s risk taking than if they held BAC
securities.165
163

See BANK OF AM. CORP., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR BANK HOLDING
COMPANIES⎯FR Y-9C, at 11 (Sept. 30, 2009), available at http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/
NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_1073757_20090930.PDF (showing total BHC assets of $2.25 trillion);
BANK OF AMERICA REPORT, supra note 150, at 10–11 (showing bank assets of $1.46 trillion).
164
This amount is simply the difference between BAC’s total assets and its assets represented by
Bank of America, N.A. See supra note 163.
165
The noisiness of the signal offered by BHC debt with respect to risk taking at the bank depends
of course on the proportion of BHC assets represented by the bank. With a higher proportion, the noise
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2. BHC Equity Incentives.—Related to this parent–subsidiary issue,
banking subsidiary debt compensation would respond directly to potentially
excessive risk-taking incentives created by the typical practice of incentivizing bankers with BHC equity-based pay.
BHC executives set the direction for the entire organization, including
the BHC’s banking subsidiaries. Performance incentives for these executives typically take the form of BHC common stock and options,166 and not
the equity of the banks themselves, which is not typically publicly traded.167
From the perspective of regulating risk taking at the bank, paying executives with BHC stock is problematic because it encourages bankers to take
risks at the bank in order to benefit the BHC. This problem manifests in at
least two important ways: layered leverage and affiliate conflicts.
a. Layered leverage.—The BHC structure creates at least two
layers of leverage that affect banks. Unlike bank equity, which is junior in
payout only to the bank’s creditors, holding company equity is junior in
payout to both the holding company’s debt and the bank’s debt.168 Assume
for simplicity’s sake that the BHC’s only asset is its equity ownership in its
subsidiary bank. Even if the bank has a positive net worth—that is, the value of its assets exceeds its liabilities and thus its equity has value—
shareholders of this simplified BHC benefit only when the value of the
bank’s assets exceeds the amount of the bank’s liabilities plus the amount
of the holding company’s liabilities. Otherwise, the value of the bank equity would go to satisfy BHC creditors. Therefore, positive but low returns
from low-risk bets by the bank may be good for the bank but not for holding company equity holders. For them, only high-risk, high-return bets may
be attractive. For bankers incentivized with BHC equity securities, the risktaking propensities are magnified by the outstanding debt at both levels.169
Related to this layered leverage, risk taking by a BHC or its other subsidiaries can affect the risk preferences at the bank. Risky bets by the
bank’s affiliates (or the bank itself) that reduce the value of holding company equity effectively increase holding company leverage, which as earlier
noted increases risk-taking incentives at the holding company. This may
problem abates. Similar issues arise with the use of other BHC securities for banker pay, as would occur
with the approaches of Bhagat and Romano, and Bebchuk and Spamann. See infra Part V.
166
As earlier noted, these incentives are supplied not just through annual compensation but also
through existing equity holdings, which typically dwarf the value of annual compensation. See supra
note 93 and accompanying text.
167
Banks wholly owned by BHCs by definition do not issue publicly traded common stock, so
BHC stock is the only common equity security available.
168
See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 6, at 258–61.
169
Besides taking risky bets, bankers may also forego the positive but low returns from less risky
bets. This is the problem of leverage-induced underinvestment. See Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of
Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147, 154−55 (1977) (demonstrating that the presence of debt financing may cause managers to forego valuable but low-return projects because the returns would inure
primarily or exclusively to creditors’ benefit).
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cause greater risk taking at the banking subsidiary as well, since the combined leverage faced by bank managers incentivized with BHC equity is
now greater.170
This effect may be especially pernicious in a systemic crisis. As bankers’ BHC stock and option holdings lose value, leverage is effectively increased, exacerbating moral hazard throughout the banking industry.
Bankers and other BHC shareholders have little to lose at that point and
much to gain from high-risk, potentially high-return projects.171
b. Affiliate conflicts.—Independent of layered leverage effects,
bankers with large BHC equity stakes may be willing to risk bank value in
order to benefit the holding company—and themselves as BHC equity
holders. For example, holding company management might force the major
banking subsidiary within the BHC (say, BankCo, N.A.) to extend a risky
loan to an unaffiliated firm (say, Shaky Debtor, Inc.) that owes significant
sums to an affiliate within the BHC (say, BankCo Commercial Credit) in
order to improve the prospects that Shaky Debtor, Inc. will be able to repay
its loan to BankCo Commercial Credit. BankCo, N.A. might not have extended the risky loan without the intercession of BHC management or
might have charged a much higher interest rate to account for the risk involved with the loan. Nevertheless, this loan might make sense from the
BHC’s perspective. Overall holding company value could be enhanced at
the bank’s expense, increasing the risk of bank failure.172
The magnitude of this potential conflict between the bank and BHC interests will depend on the proportion of BHC value that a given bank
represents. As mentioned earlier, each of the largest banks is typically the
dominant financial institution within its BHC, representing the lion’s share
of the BHC’s revenues, profits, and assets. For example, JPMorgan Chase
Bank, the nation’s largest commercial bank,173 represents over 80% of the
total assets of its BHC.174 Any misalignment of the interests of the BHC
and its dominant banking subsidiary is therefore likely to be relatively
small. The conflict may be greater at Bank of America, N.A., which as

170

See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 6, at 258–61. The situation is even worse with BHC equity options, which offer a large upside but, unlike equity, may have very little downside. See Walker,
supra note 110, at 446–47.
171
See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 6, at 271–72.
172
Banking regulations curb the most egregious of these problems, such as sweetheart loans for affiliates. However, investment decisions are notoriously difficult to police for these types of conflicts.
173
See Financial Reports of Leading Banks, supra note 161 (showing JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
as the largest U.S. bank by assets as of December 31, 2010, with $1.63 trillion in assets).
174
See JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR BANK HOLDING
COMPANIES⎯FR Y-9C, at 11 (Sept. 30, 2009), available at http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/
NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_1039502_20090930.PDF (showing total BHC assets of $2.04 trillion);
JPMORGAN REPORT, supra note 150, at 10 (showing bank assets of $1.7 trillion).
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previously noted represents only 65% of the total assets within Bank of
America Corporation.
More generally, as the economic significance of a bank within its BHC
decreases, the BHC’s interests are more likely to diverge from those of the
bank, making BHC equity compensation for bank managers increasingly
problematic from the standpoint of bank safety and soundness. Goldman
Sachs and Morgan Stanley offer extreme examples. Long-time investment
banks, these firms converted to bank holding companies in the midst of the
recent financial crisis, a move that gave them permanent access to the Federal Reserve’s lending facilities.175 Unlike traditional commercial banking
organizations, the commercial banking operations of these two newly
minted BHCs account for only a small portion of their business activities.
For example, Morgan Stanley, depicted in Figure 3, is the nation’s sixth
largest BHC. Its one commercial bank—though among the thirty largest
commercial banks—represents less than 8.5% of the holding company’s total assets.176 Managers incentivized with holding company equity may be
inclined to put the bank at risk in order to benefit the holding company and
other affiliates.177

175

Andrew Ross Sorkin & Vikas Bajaj, Radical Shift for Goldman and Morgan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
22, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/22/business/22bank.html.
176
MORGAN STANLEY, CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR BANK HOLDING
COMPANIES⎯FR Y-9C, at 11 (Sept. 30, 2009), available at http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/
NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_2162966_20090930.PDF (showing total BHC assets of $770 billion);
MORGAN STANLEY BANK, N.A., CONSOLIDATED REPORTS OF CONDITION AND INCOME FOR A BANK
WITH DOMESTIC OFFICES ONLY⎯FFIEC 041, at 10 (Sept. 30, 2009), available at https://cdr.ffiec.gov/
public/ManageFacsimiles.aspx (Report Type: Call\TFR; Single Date: 9/30/2009; Institution: Morgan
Stanley Bank, National Association) (showing bank assets of $65 billion). As for Goldman Sachs
Group, the nation’s fifth largest BHC, banking assets make up only 13% of its total assets. GOLDMAN
SACHS GROUP, INC., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES⎯FR
Y-9C, at 11 (Sept. 30, 2009), available at http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/
FRY9C_2380443_20090930.PDF (showing total BHC assets of $882 billion); GOLDMAN SACHS BANK
USA, CONSOLIDATED REPORTS OF CONDITION AND INCOME FOR A BANK WITH DOMESTIC OFFICES
ONLY⎯FFIEC 041, at 9 (Sept. 30, 2009), available at https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/
ManageFacsimiles.aspx (Report Type: Call\TFR; Single Date: 9/30/2009; Institution: Goldman Sachs
Bank) (showing bank assets of $115 billion). Finally, MetLife, traditionally a life insurance company,
is the seventh largest U.S. BHC. Its banking assets make up only 2.4% of BHC assets. METLIFE, INC.,
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES⎯FR Y-9C, at 11 (Sept. 30,
2009), available at http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/NICDataCache/FRY9C/FRY9C_2945824_
20090930.PDF (showing total BHC assets of $535 billion); METLIFE BANK, N.A., CONSOLIDATED
REPORTS OF CONDITION AND INCOME FOR A BANK WITH DOMESTIC OFFICES ONLY⎯FFIEC 041, at 9
(Sept. 30, 2009), available at https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/ManageFacsimiles.aspx (Report Type:
Call\TFR; Single Date: 9/30/2009; Institution: MetLife Bank) (showing bank assets of $13 billion).
177
This inclination may explain why large banking subsidiaries do not issue publicly traded stock.
The presence of minority shareholders would impede BHC efforts to exploit synergies across subsidiaries because putting the bank at risk to benefit its affiliates within the BHC group might attract charges of
self-dealing and lawsuits by the minority. See Evanoff & Wall, supra note 137, at 125 (suggesting this
as a hypothesis).
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FIGURE 3
MORGAN STANLEY HOLDING COMPANY STRUCTURE
Morgan Stanley
$770 billion

Other Financial Institutions and Assets

Morgan Stanley
Bank, N.A.

$705 billion

$65 billion
(< 8.5% of BHC assets)

(> 91.5% of BHC assets)

Granted, regulatory supervision extends to BHCs and their nonbank activities,178 and affiliate transactions attract special scrutiny.179 However,
regulatory oversight may be inconsistent or unreliable, and it may be difficult to police the myriad business strategies that banks might undertake to
benefit their nonbank affiliates. Especially given that BHCs’ nonbank activities are riskier than banking, and therefore potentially more profitable,
BHC equity incentives may encourage bank risk taking to boost these potentially more profitable activities.
*

*

*

Banker pay in the form of subordinated debt issued at the bank level
would directly counter the BHC-equity-fueled incentive to bet the bank.
178

For example, BHCs are subject to risk-based supervision and must comply with capital adequacy rules. See FED. RESERVE SYS., FRAMEWORK FOR RISK-FOCUSED SUPERVISION OF LARGE COMPLEX
INSTITUTIONS 1, 4 (1997), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/SRletters/1997/
sr9724a1.pdf (describing the application of the Federal Reserve’s risk-focused supervisory framework to
bank holding companies); BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., APPLYING SUPERVISORY
GUIDANCE AND REGULATIONS ON THE PAYMENT OF DIVIDENDS, STOCK REDEMPTIONS, AND STOCK
REPURCHASES AT BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, SR 09-4, at 2 (Mar. 27, 2009), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2009/SR0904.pdf (discussing BHC capital adequacy
requirements).
179
Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(4) (2006) (requiring that all covered transactions between a bank and its affiliates be consistent with safe and sound banking practices); § 371c(b) (requiring
that certain transactions with an affiliate be on market terms); Regulation W, 12 C.F.R. § 223.21–.56
(2010) (implementing § 371c(a)–(b)).
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Whether to overcome layered leverage or to enhance the value of affiliates
within the BHC, either BHC strategy comes at the bank’s expense, and
bank sub debt may be a well-matched antidote.
IV. COMPARING OTHER APPROACHES
In addition to my own proposal, two important academic proposals
have recently emerged to restructure bank executive compensation in the
service of financial regulation, one from Sanjai Bhagat and Roberta Romano, and the other from Lucian Bebchuk and Holger Spamann. This Part
discusses these efforts and compares them with my own.
In addition to issues specific to each approach, both proposals suffer
from two important shortcomings when compared to my sub-debt approach.
First, both proposals rely on holding company securities as incentive pay.
As earlier discussed, because market pricing of BHC securities may offer
only a very noisy proxy for risk taking and performance at a given banking
subsidiary, such securities may provide bankers only weak incentives with
regard to activities at the bank.180 Second, both proposals focus exclusively
on the structure of annual compensation, ignoring the much more significant incentive effects of bankers’ existing portfolios of equity and other
claims on their banking firms.181 Tailored adjustment of bankers’ existing
portfolio incentives would be difficult to achieve under either of these approaches. These two issues are better addressed with subordinated debt issued directly by important banking subsidiaries.182
I first consider each proposal on its own merits. I then compare them
with my bank sub debt approach.
A. Bhagat and Romano: Long-Term Restricted Stock
Remaining true to the traditional equity-based focus of incentive compensation, Sanjai Bhagat and Roberta Romano have devised a simple yet
180

See supra Part III.D. Recall that the target bankers for our incentive compensation include the
members of the management group with policy authority over the bank. This will likely include the
bank CEO and other top bank officers. It is likely also to include BHC officers, who typically have significant influence over banking subsidiaries’ policy. Further, it is not uncommon that certain BHC officers also hold key officer positions at a banking subsidiary. See supra notes 159–62 and
accompanying text.
181
Other scholars have recognized that focusing exclusively on annual compensation is not sufficient. See John E. Core et al., Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey, FRBNY ECON.
POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 27, 30 (“A key point in analyzing executive incentives is that an executive’s
incentives from stock and options are properly measured by portfolio incentives . . . . [O]ne cannot determine whether an executive has an appropriate level of incentives by examining newly granted restricted stock and options compensation in a given year.” (citations omitted)).
182
Moreover, banking subsidiaries’ debt securities may be periodically rolled over—redeemed and
reissued—in order to impose continuing capital market discipline on banks and bankers. See supra Part
III.C. This would be quite difficult to accomplish under either the Bhagat–Romano or Bebchuk–
Spamann approach.
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radical restricted stock proposal. They argue that all equity-based compensation should take the form of restricted stock and restricted stock options.
An executive would not be permitted to sell the stock or exercise the options until two to four years after the executive leaves the firm.183 According to Bhagat and Romano, the two- to four-year post-retirement holding
period would give executives appropriate intermediate-term incentives.
Two years is sufficiently lengthy a period to deter managers from the pursuit of short-term profits from taking undue risks or manipulating earnings
or public statements during their tenure. The four-year upper limit on the
holding period would be sufficient for the effects of the executive’s decisions and strategies to be realized. Their proposal is targeted primarily at
TARP recipient firms, but they note that their argument could be extended
to all financial firms that enjoy federal deposit insurance.184
The lengthy holding period is the central feature of the Bhagat–Romano
proposal. Restricted stock and option compensation is not new, but the typical vesting period under these compensation plans is three to five years after the grant date,185 and the executive is typically required to remain
employed by the company at the time the stock or options vest.186 By contrast, Bhagat and Romano’s proposal would require the executive to have
left the firm and a number of years to have elapsed before the executive
could cash out. Bhagat and Romano note some of the distortions that arise
with this compensation structure. Managers under such stringent holding
periods will be underdiversified, reducing the risk-adjusted expected return
of their portfolios.187 Bhagat and Romano suggest simply increasing the
size of the stock or option grant, which would increase the expected return
to compensate for the underdiversification.188 But that approach is inefficient insofar as each additional share of stock or option compensation costs
the firm more than its value to the executive.189

183

Bhagat & Romano, supra note 7, at 361.
Id. at 367.
185
FREDERICK W. COOK & CO., THE 2008 TOP 250: LONG-TERM INCENTIVE GRANT PRACTICES
FOR EXECUTIVES 17 (2008) (noting that options vest in three years for about 50% of large U.S. companies, in four years for about 30% of firms, and in five years for about 15% of firms).
186
Walker, supra note 110, at 448 n.64.
187
Bhagat & Romano, supra note 7, at 367. Hedging would be prohibited, as it would defeat the
incentive effects of the restricted stock compensation. Id. at 368.
188
Id.
189
Walker, supra note 110, at 458 (noting that executives would effectively be receiving more of
something they value less). There is the added problem that because current rules on executive compensation disclosure require valuation of stock awards at the market price—and would therefore not account
for executives’ underdiversification discount—the value of these stock awards would be overstated, potentially exacerbating public outrage over executive compensation levels. See id.
184
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Their general concept has some appeal. Like subordinated debt, equity
prices also incorporate a firm’s solvency risk.190 With sufficiently long
holding periods, equity holdings and equity-based incentives might curb
managers’ short-term risk taking. After all, managers whose equity-based
payday comes after they have resigned their executive positions must consider the longer-term effects of their decisions and not just quarterly results.
On the other hand, the delayed gratification inherent in this lengthy
holding period creates important problems. First, it weakens any incentive
effects.191 Managers facing uncertain payoffs many years into the future
may be too conservative in their project selection or may simply care less
about firm performance, especially given the significant “control gap”—the
period after retirement and before their equity payoffs, during which they
will have no influence over the firm’s performance.192 In addition, the potentially long delay between performance and pay creates a liquidity problem for executives because a large portion of their compensation cannot be
spent for years after it is earned.193 Acknowledging this problem, Bhagat
and Romano suggest that the limit on tax deductibility of non-performancebased compensation be raised from $1 million to $2 million194 in order to allow for greater cash compensation to executives being paid with restricted
stock. This alleviates the liquidity problem to some extent. However,
higher levels of fixed compensation also blunt the performance incentives
that drive their proposal.
In addition, using retirement from the firm as a trigger gives good
CEOs an incentive to retire too soon. Bhagat and Romano argue that the
holding period is not really so onerous, given that the median CEO tenure
for large U.S. companies is five years.195 The median, however, may not
fully capture the magnitude of the premature retirement problem. For policymaking purposes, the variance of CEO tenure also matters. A wide dispersion may mean that a large proportion of CEO’s must wait fifteen or
twenty years to cash out their earliest granted restricted stock or options.
190

This useful effect is qualified by the “noisy proxy” problem that arises from the use of BHC securities to compensate bankers as opposed to securities issued by the bank itself. See supra Part III.D.
191
George Ainslie & John Monterosso, Will as Intertemporal Bargaining: Implications for Rationality, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 825, 830 (2003) (explaining experimental evidence showing that the value of
the reward is “inversely proportional to delay”).
192
This control gap may increase their incentives to actively participate in the wise choice of their
successors, but it is not clear whether their current incentives are inadequate.
193
See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 7, at 368.
194
See I.R.C. § 162(m)(1) (2006) (“[N]o deduction shall be allowed under this chapter for applicable employee remuneration . . . to the extent that the amount of such remuneration . . . exceeds
$1,000,000.”); Bhagat & Romano, supra note 7, at 368.
195
They point out that executives facing a seven- to nine-year wait to cash out their earliest received
stock and option grants would not be unique to financial firms, as general partners of private equity
firms must often wait seven to ten years to receive the bulk of the carried interest portion of their compensation. Bhagat & Romano, supra note 7, at 369.
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Perversely, since the best performing CEOs are likely to enjoy the longest
tenure, they are likely to feel most keenly the constraints of the Bhagat–
Romano holding period. The best CEOs may retire earlier than is optimal
for their firms in order to be able to cash out sooner.
B. Bebchuk and Spamann: Paying by the Slice
Lucian Bebchuk and Holger Spamann propose that, for financial firms,
banker pay should be linked not just to improved shareholder returns, but to
firms’ enterprise value as represented by a diversified basket of each firm’s
securities.196 Banker pay should be tied to the value of a proportionate slice
of all the BHC’s securities197—its preferred stock and bonds, as well as
common equity—thereby linking pay to “a larger part of the corporate
pie.”198 Including common and preferred shares and bonds in this basket
would expose managers to a broader range of downside risks to which the
firms’ various investors are subject and would tend to deter excessive risk
taking.199
Bebchuk and Spamann’s approach takes important steps in the right direction. Including BHC preferred stock and bonds as part of executives’ incentive pay would offer a clear improvement to the current commonshareholder-focused, equity-based approach. Because holders of preferred
stock and bonds generally prefer less risk than common shareholders, inclusion of these securities more closely aligns managers’ incentives with those
of regulators interested in safety and soundness and the preservation of the
FDIC insurance fund.200

196

Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 6, at 253.
Id. at 284 (proposing that executive pay be tied to “a set percentage of the aggregate value of
common shares, preferred shares, and all outstanding bonds”). Though the authors do not explicitly distinguish BHC securities from those of banking subsidiaries, their approach only works with holding
company securities, since banking subsidiaries do not issue public equity—their common stock is held
entirely by their BHC—or preferred stock.
198
Id. at 283. For example, for TARP firms, because of the government’s large stake in the preferred stock of these firms, executive pay should track aggregate returns on a specified percentage of the
value of all common and preferred shares. This would align managers’ incentives somewhat with
shareholders’ interests but also somewhat with the public interest in having TARP investments repaid.
See id. at 283–84.
199
Bebchuk and Spamann suggest additional benchmarks to which executive pay might be linked in
order to curb risk taking. Perhaps executive pay could be reduced based on the amount of any government payments made to support the bank—including deposit insurance payments—during the one-year
period after the executive’s departure from the firm. See id. at 284. The authors suggest that any expected increase in future government payments could be proxied by multiplying the value of the bank’s
(presumably insured) deposits by any increase in the implied probability of default that may be inferred
from the price of credit default swaps. Id.
200
Bebchuk and Spamann also argue that bankers’ pay should be regulated, or at least carefully
monitored, as an important facet of banking regulation generally, independent of the current crisis and
the attendant government support. See id. at 278–79.
197
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On the other hand, while this approach will generally reduce managers’
risk-taking proclivities at the BHC level and has some intuitive investordemocratic appeal, it does not precisely respond to the original problem.
The problem is not underrepresentation of BHC investors but moral hazard
at the banking subsidiary and risk externalization to the public fisc. Because bank managers’ individual situations will vary in ways that are not
correlated with their BHCs’ capital structures, there is no conceptual basis
for assuming that executive pay in the form of a representative slice of the
BHC’s securities will offer appropriate incentives to internalize risk at the
banking subsidiary. Managers’ existing holdings of their firm’s securities
will vary, for example.201 Because of the strong incentive effects of these
existing holdings and their variation across managers,202 paying by the slice
may not be appropriate for each individual manager. Adherence to strict
proportionality across classes of the bank’s securities in structuring incentive compensation forsakes flexibility that may be useful in tailoring compensation to address specific managers’ existing incentives.
C. Comparing
For purposes of constraining bank risk taking, long-term restricted BHC
stock or pay-by-the-BHC-slice compensation may offer some improvement
over the standard BHC equity approach that currently dominates banker pay
structures. However, my bank sub-debt approach is superior for its focus
on bank risk, its stronger market discipline, and its utility in tailoring bankers’ portfolio incentives.
Bank-issued subordinated debt offers a clearer market signal concerning risk taking at the bank than long-term BHC equity or a slice of BHC securities,203 giving market actors, regulators, and bankers better information
about default risk and more finely tailoring managerial incentives to risk
regulatory goals. This market discipline may be enhanced through a program of regular periodic issuance of new debt securities, which requires the
bank to continually access public capital markets for fresh capital and sub-

201

Banks’ and BHCs’ growth opportunities also vary, which affects the optimal level of risk taking,
though growth opportunities may correlate with capital structure. Managers’ inside debt holdings in the
form of pensions and deferred compensation also vary, and these have been shown to affect managers’
risk-taking proclivities. See supra Part III.A.
202
See supra Part III.
203
Adding more basket components to account for future government payments required to support
the bank, as Bebchuk and Spamann suggest, further complicates any market pricing signal, especially if
the component depends on actual future payments, for which no readily available market pricing exists.
Even relying on credit default swap (CDS) pricing may be problematic, as CDS markets are fragmented
and opaque. Subordinated debt markets, by contrast, are likely to be more liquid and transparent for
large banks.
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ject itself to primary market review.204 This periodic market review is unworkable for compensation arrangements that rely on long-term restricted
BHC equity or that attempt to mirror BHC capital structures.205
No approach based solely on BHC securities can directly address
layered leverage and affiliate conflict problems.206 Overall BHC risk taking
might be reduced with long-term restricted BHC stock or by-the-slice BHC
securities for bankers but that would not necessarily incentivize bankers to
reduce risk at the bank.
Pay-by-the-BHC-slice does better than long-term restricted stock for
addressing layered leverage, since the BHC debt securities would have value even if the BHC were insolvent.207 Pay-by-the slice might therefore reduce bankers’ incentives to gamble in high leverage or distress situations as
compared with standard BHC equity compensation. Again, however, because bankers holding BHC securities would be concerned primarily with
BHC value, affiliate conflicts would remain problematic. Bankers might
still bet the bank to save the BHC.
Subordinated bank debt offers superior incentives along these margins
compared to long-term BHC equity or BHC securities by the slice. Subordinated debt compensation more directly reduces the layered leverage incentives from BHC equity because bankers would have a direct stake in the
value of debt at the bank level. Affiliate conflicts would also be much more
aggressively ameliorated because sacrificing the bank to benefit BHC equity would have a direct negative impact on bankers’ personal bank sub-debt
holdings.

204

Weaker banks may even find themselves unable to float the required issue, an event with serious
consequences for the bank and one that sends a clear market signal. Cf. Calomiris & Powell, supra note
142, at 169 (describing inability of weaker Argentine banks to issue required subordinated debt).
205
There is no public market for Bhagat and Romano’s long-term restricted BHC stock. And the
trading price of the outstanding BHC common stock would not offer a useful metric for valuing longterm restricted stock because of the extreme holding period applicable to BHC executives, which puts
their holdings in a completely different category. As for Bebchuk and Spamann’s pay-by-the-slice proposal, BHCs might issue new publicly traded common and preferred shares and debt periodically.
However, unlike regular bank sub-debt issues, periodic by-the-BHC-slice issuances would be difficult to
structure as important capital-raising events for the BHC because large periodic issues of common
shares would dilute existing shareholders’ equity holdings. Nominal issuances, of course, would not
impose stringent market review.
In any event, for both long-term restricted BHC stock and by-the-BHC-slice securities, the market
would be reviewing the financial health of the BHC and not the soundness of the bank.
206
See supra Part III.D.2.
207
Long-term restricted BHC stock might temper bet-the-bank strategies for improving BHC value
to some extent. Bankers’ long time horizon might discourage them from extreme short-term risky strategies. However, bankers holding even long-term restricted BHC stock care primarily about BHC returns. Facing distress-induced high BHC leverage, for example, bankers might reason that the long run
may never arrive if the BHC fails. So short-run gambles for BHC solvency may still be attractive, even
if they require sacrificing the bank.
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Sub-debt compensation can also directly manage bankers’ portfolio incentives. Annual adjustments to bankers’ pay could account for changes in
the composition of bankers’ personal portfolios and changes in banks’ risk
profiles. By contrast, neither long-term restricted BHC stock compensation
nor pay-by-the-BHC-slice can offer this sort of fine-tuning of portfolio incentives.208 Again, any portfolio of BHC securities may offer only coarse
incentives with respect to risk taking at the bank and may even increase
bank risk taking in some circumstances.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
The regulation of bankers’ pay should not be viewed as a substitute for
existing banking regulation but rather as an integral part of the regulatory
structure.209 With an additional tool to encourage banker prudence and to
monitor bank safety and soundness, regulators may be able to more finely
balance the competing concerns of risk regulation and bank profitability.
For example, better prudential incentives in executive pay arrangements
may justify lower deposit insurance premiums, less stringent capital requirements, or less burdensome reporting requirements or onsite examinations for a given bank.
This Part discusses two important implementation issues: how to go
about setting substantive targets for bankers’ inside debt portfolios and how
to encourage banks to use bank sub-debt compensation in pursuit of banker
portfolio management. Given the complexity of large banks and BHCs, the
attendant complexity of banking regulation, and the novelty of using banker
pay as an instrument of risk regulation, much will have to be learned
through experience. This Part sketches some key considerations moving
forward.

208

As earlier noted, Kenneth Feinberg, the special master overseeing compensation at the largest
seven TARP recipient companies, slashed salaries in favor of long-term stock grants, which vest over
four years. See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text. While this approach may respond to popular outrage over executive pay, its superficial popular appeal does not offer a long-term solution to executive risk taking. Though annual compensation is easy to observe, for executives with even a few
years’ tenure, annual pay is almost certainly dwarfed by the value of the executives’ preexisting portfolios of their banks’ securities. Even if every annual stock grant carries a four-year vesting period, in a
short time the value of an executive’s unrestricted stock will exceed that of her restricted stock, so shortterm incentives may outweigh longer-term concerns.
Lengthening the holding period, of course, runs into greater liquidity, diversification, and delayed
gratification problems discussed in the context of the Bhagat–Romano proposal.
209
As John, Saunders, and Senbet note, bank regulation that accounts for the incentives of top management will be more effective. John, Saunders & Senbet, supra note 21, at 97.
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A. Setting Debt–Equity Targets
Calibrating the optimal debt–equity targets for bankers’ pay and portfolios might be tricky and will depend on bank-specific factors,210 as well as
the corporate structure effects discussed above.211 For example, the amount
of bank-level subordinated debt in a banker’s portfolio should be calibrated
to counter the incentive effects of her BHC equity holdings and layered leverage on risk taking at the bank. Greater layered leverage will require
greater bank sub-debt holdings as a counterweight to the risk-inducing incentives of leverage.212 A consideration of the size and economic importance of the bank relative to the BHC’s other subsidiaries will also be
important. If the bank is the dominant subsidiary in the BHC, as is the case
with JPMorgan Chase Bank,213 affiliate conflicts are less of a concern.214 By
contrast, when the bank is less important economically to the BHC as a
whole, such as Morgan Stanley Bank,215 more bank sub-debt holdings
should be required of the relevant bankers. Greater bank sub-debt holdings
will help bankers resist the temptation to take risky bets at the bank to benefit affiliates, since greater risk at the bank will result in a negative price
reaction in the public debt market and a reduction in the value of bankers’
bank sub-debt holdings.
In addition, the existing personal asset portfolios of individual bankers
will affect the structure of the optimal compensation contract. As already
noted, inside debt in the form of pensions and deferred compensation has
important effects on managerial risk taking,216 and these debt holdings
should also be taken into account.217 With these various considerations,
bankers’ personal debt–equity ratios can be adjusted to maintain appropriate
risk-taking incentives in the face of new conditions affecting the bank or
market price movements that might otherwise skew the weighting of bankers’ portfolios.
210

The inside debt literature identifies a number of factors: leverage, capital structure, investment
opportunities, ownership structure, and default risk. See Bagnani et al., supra note 60, at 454 (finding
that the effects of equity-based pay on managers’ risk taking is not monotonic); Edmans & Liu, supra
note 112, at 78 (noting that the optimal amount of debt increases with leverage, the probability of default, and managers’ ability to affect liquidation values, and decreases with growth opportunities); John,
Saunders & Senbet, supra note 21, at 96 (noting that bank managers’ risk-shifting incentives depend
crucially on the characteristics of the bank’s investment opportunities).
211
See supra Part III.D.
212
See supra notes 168–71 and accompanying text.
213
See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
214
BHC equity incentives will still need to be addressed, of course.
215
See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
216
See supra Part III.A.
217
Bankers’ pensions and deferred compensation are likely to be obligations of their holding companies and not of the banking subsidiaries. Therefore, the effects of this inside BHC debt on risk taking
at the banks are likely to be indirect, dependent on the corporate structure of the BHC. See supra Part
III.D.
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B. Implementation Incentives
Because of each bank’s unique situation and the fine judgments required to optimize compensation arrangements, strict regulatory mandates
seem inadvisable. Generalized mandates are likely to offer a poor fit for
many banks, and mandates may be difficult to revise in the face of changed
circumstances.
Instead, banking regulators could offer guidelines and regulatory incentives to encourage appropriate amounts of subordinated debt in bankers’
pay arrangements, while at the same time preserving the discretion of
boards of directors to set pay. For example, executive pay structures could
be included as a factor in the setting of deposit insurance premiums.218 The
current deposit insurance pricing scheme requires the FDIC to grade each
bank on its capital ratios and other information and to assign it to one of
four risk categories. Within each category, pricing is then determined based
on additional bank-specific factors.219 The FDIC could similarly grade executive compensation, relying on a handful of grades to differentiate compensation schemes from a prudential regulatory perspective.220 Grading
could reflect, among other things, the debt–equity composition of execu218

John, Saunders & Senbet, supra note 21, at 98 (proposing that risk-based pricing of deposit insurance should incorporate features of bank managers’ compensation).
219
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., CAPITAL GROUPS AND SUPERVISORY GROUPS, http://www.fdic.gov/
deposit/insurance/risk/rrps_ovr.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2011).
220
Even before the recent financial crisis, bank executives’ compensation was subject to regulatory
scrutiny to assure that it was not excessive and would not lead to a material financial loss. See, e.g.,
First Nat’l Bank of Eden v. Dep’t of Treasury, 568 F.2d 610, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (affirming
an order of the Comptroller of the Currency finding that excessive compensation constituted an unsafe
or unsound banking practice).
Section 39(c) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) required that bank regulators prescribe standards for executive compensation as part of safety and soundness regulation. 12 U.S.C. § 1831p-1(c)(1)(a) (2006). Interagency guidelines on the matter followed.
Interagency Guidelines Establishing Standards for Safety and Soundness, 12 C.F.R. § 364 app. A
(2010). However, the guidelines on executive compensation added little to the statutory language. See
Schooner, supra note 99, at 892.
Especially relevant for our inquiry, regulators have scrutinized incentive compensation structures
under this framework, rejecting arrangements that create perverse risk-taking incentives. See id. at 873–
75 & n.63; see also COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ADM’R OF NAT’L BANKS, INSIDER ACTIVITIES:
COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK 13 (2006) (cautioning that banks should prevent the payment of compensation that could lead to material financial loss to the bank). Regulators have also imposed limits on executive compensation, including conditions or prohibitions on raises and bonus payments. See
Schooner, supra note 99, at 878. Regulators have ordered banks to conduct prospective comprehensive
reviews of their compensation systems, id. at 882, and have even required banks to submit incentive
compensation plans for regulators’ approval. See Order to Cease and Desist to Westsound Bank, No.
FDIC-08-038b, at 4–5 (Mar. 10, 2008), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/enforcement/
2008-03-08.pdf. Regulators have taken an especially dim view of the enforceability of executive severance agreements once a bank has become insolvent or has entered receivership. See Schooner, supra
note 99, at 904−11. Further elaboration of guidelines to encourage some form of subordinated debt
compensation does not seem a great stretch, especially in light of the financial crisis and the role that
executive compensation has played.
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tives’ pay packages and personal portfolios and the specific features of the
component securities, all in the context of each bank’s situation. This grading could then be incorporated into insurance pricing.221 Such an approach
would be consistent with the renewed regulatory attention to financial institutions’ incentive pay arrangements mandated by the Dodd–Frank Act.222
Relying on regulators to incorporate banker pay arrangements into their
discretionary regulatory strategies carries certain risks, of course. In addition to the standard regulatory agency conflicts,223 risk-based pricing of deposit insurance is not easy to implement as a technical matter, especially
with respect to the largest banks, because of the difficulty of quantifying the
credit risk in a bank’s loan portfolio.224 Perhaps because of this difficulty,
risk-based pricing has not historically differentiated very finely among
banks: almost all banks have paid the same lowest rate.225 Such a premium
structure offers only weak incentives for banks to reduce risk. In addition,
even if insurance pricing better differentiated among banks, for some BHCs
deposit insurance costs might be trivial relative to the BHC’s overall activities. In that situation, even high premiums would be insufficient to induce
socially desirable changes in banker pay arrangements.226 More drastic inducements might be required, such as adjustment of banks’ capital requirements to account for executive pay and portfolio structures, which would
directly affect bank risk taking and profitability.
Though regulatory intervention in this area may be tricky, my proposal
nevertheless enhances the regulatory tool kit for encouraging prudent bank-

221

See John, Saunders & Senbet, supra note 21, at 96–97.
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 956,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010); see supra note 106 and accompanying text.
223
See Frederic S. Mishkin, Evaluating FDICIA, in 9 RESEARCH IN FINANCIAL SERVICES: PRIVATE
AND PUBLIC POLICY 17 (George Kaufman ed., 1997) (discussing principal–agent problems in banking
regulation). Regulators may forbear from taking action against a faltering bank, either because of political pressure from the bank’s allies or because regulators would rather delay exposing their own regulatory failings in the hope that the bank might work its own way out of trouble. Id.
224
Id. at 25.
225
Benston & Kaufman, supra note 140, at 149 (finding that in 1996, almost all banks qualified for
the two lowest risk categories); Mishkin, supra note 223, at 25 (noting that as of 1997, well over 90% of
banks paid the lowest premium rate). The Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005 gave the
FDIC some greater discretion to implement risk-based premium classifications. George G. Pennacchi,
Deposit Insurance 7 (Aug. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.cbpp.illinois.edu/
pdf/research/George_DepInsRevGP.pdf. At the time of its adoption, only 45% of banks were being
charged the minimum rate. Id. As of June 30, 2008, only 45% of the Risk Category I (safest) large
banks were paying the minimum rate. 74 Fed. Reg. 9525, 9527–28 (Mar. 4, 2009) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 327).
226
This weak deterrence from high deposit insurance premiums applies to risk taking at the bank
more generally. As earlier noted, for a bank that represents only a small part of a BHC’s business activities, BHC managers may be willing to take risks at the bank to benefit other BHC subsidiaries. See supra Part III.D.2. Increased deposit insurance costs might be a trivial consideration. I am indebted to
David Walker for raising this point.
222
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ing.227 Even an imperfect approach to encouraging debt compensation offers an improvement over the current situation.228
CONCLUSION
I have proposed a new approach to compensating bankers that explicitly
incorporates market discipline and a pay-for-performance strategy to constrain excessive risk taking. The key feature of my approach is to include
banks’ subordinated debt securities as part of bankers’ compensation. In
addition, I argue that the primary focus for structuring banker pay should be
on the composition of their personal portfolios of their banks’ securities and
other claims on their banks. The current spotlight on annual pay alone
misses the much stronger influence that managers’ personal portfolios exert
on their risk-taking incentives.
Using bank subordinated debt to adjust bankers’ portfolios away from
excessively risky strategies has important advantages over existing approaches, which ignore portfolio effects and rely solely on BHC securities,
and which may provide only a noisy signal of risk taking at BHCs’ banking
subsidiaries.
Important details of this approach will need to be worked out through
practical experience. In this time of critical regulatory reexamination and
experimentation, bonding bankers to less risky strategies seems a worthy
project.

227

An overarching caveat concerning the possibility of a government bailout deserves mention. See
supra note 146.
228
Moreover, despite these difficulties, the FDIC has begun to consider tying premiums to bankers’
compensation arrangements. Joe Adler, Plan to Link Premiums to Comp Already Under Fire, AM.
BANKER, Jan. 8, 2010, at 1. This is surely a step in the right direction. As part of their efforts to reduce
systemic risk, bank regulators should monitor executive compensation arrangements and incorporate this
scrutiny as part of their supervisory function.
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